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Developing  countries can use privatization  to attract foreign
investment  in two ways: by selling  assets to foreign  investors
and by improving the general economic  environment  so that
investment  seems more  likely to be profitable.
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Foreigv?  direct  investment  in the  developing  The relative  size  of the  privatization  program
world  has grown  rapidly  in recet years,  making  and  the  degree  of openness  to foreigners  are
it one  of the  most  importat sources  of financing  important  detenninants  of foreign  direct  invest-
to developing  countries.  Sader  presents  a data-  ment.  Each  dollar  in privatization  revenue
basw  on about  1,1I00  global  privatizatlor  transac-  generates  an additional  35 cents  in new  foreign
dons  from  1988  through  1992.  direct  investmnent  inflows,  and  a 1  percent
increase  in foreign  participation  adds  another  50
Between  1988  and 1992,  developing  country  cents.
governments  eamned  almost  US$62  billon in
revenues  from  the sale  of state-owned  assets.  In addition  to the direct  inflow  of funds
About  a third  of those  revenues  came  from  through  the  sale  of assets,  many  developing
foreign  sources.  Privatization  in Latin  America  countries  also  increasingly  attracted  foreign
represents  about  66  percent  of privatization  in  investment  outside  of  their  privatization  pro-
the  developing  world.  Privatization  in Europe,  grams.  Privatization  of infrastructure  and  the
including  Eastern  Europe,  accounts  for 17  financial  sector  especially  seem  to have  sent
percent,  and  privatization  in East  Asia, 13  important  signals  to foreign  investors,  indicating
percent.  The  beaviest  foreign  participation  is in  an imnproved  economic  envirounment  and  possibly
Eastern  Eumpe,;  primarily  for  lack  of domestic  the  eventual  elimination  of bottlenecks.  Im-
financing.  proved  expectations  about  the  profitability  of
investment  projects  render  these  countries  more
Foreign  investors'  general  participation  in  attractive  to foreign  investors.
privatization  programs  was  strong,  providing
developing  countries  with  substantial  amnounts  of
foreign  exchange.
T'he  Prlicy  Reseach Working  Pape Series  disseninates  the  findings  of work  under  way  in  the  Bank.  An objective  of the  seTies
is to get thee  findings out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings,  interpretations,  and
conchisions  in theme  papers do not  necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
Produced  by the Policy  Reseach Dissemination  CenterPRIVATIZATIONS  AN.3
FOREIGN  INVESTMENT  IN THE




International  Economics  Department
Numerous  individuals  within the World  Bank as well as outside provided  support in the data collection.
Without  their help, this study would have been impossible. Special thanks in this respect go to Antonio
Estache and Maziar Minovi.  Also thanks for many helpful comments on  earlier drafts from Stijn
Claessens,  Guy Pfeffermann,  Gerd Schwartz,  as well as the economists  at IECDI,TABLE  OF CONTENTS
I.  Introduction  .......... ,  ... 3
IH.  Early Experiences  with Privatizations  ..............................  ........5
II.1 The Formation  of State-Owned  Enterprises  (SOEs)  .5
11.2  The Early  Phase of Privatizations..............  7...................7
III.  The Recent Wave of Privatizations,  1988-1992  .10
11.  I The Data  ........  ,,,,  10
III.2 Global  Trends in Privatizations  .11
111.2  Trer,ds  in Developing  Country  Privatizations  ............................................  12
IV. Privatizations  as a Source of Foreign  Exchange  .17
IV.1 Data  ....  17
IV.2 Overall  Trends  ............  17
IV.3 Portfolio  Equity  Investments  .19
IV4 Foreign  Direct  Investment  ....................  21
V.  Privatization  Experiences  at the Country  Level  .22
VI. Do Privatizations  Attract Foreign  Direct  Investors . 24
VII. Conclusion  .....................  31
ANNEX:  COUNTRY  NOTES  .33
A Latin America  and the Caribbean  .......................  ,  33
B Europe and Central  Asia  .37
C East Asia and Pacific  .39
D  South Asia  .40
E  Sub-Saharan  Africa  .41
F North Africa  and the Middle  East  .......................  42
APPENDIX
Table  A-1: Privatization  Transactions  in the Developing  World: 1988-1992
Table  A-2:  Privatization  Transactions  in the Industrialized  World: 1988-1992
Table  A-3: Foreign  Direct  Investment  from Privatizations:  1988-1992
Table  A-4: Privatizations  as Share  of Foreign  Direct Investment:  1988-1992
BIBLIOGRAPHYSUMMARY
Foreign direct  investment in the developing world experienced a rapid growth in recent
years, rendering it one  the most important financial flows to  developing countries as a
whole  One of the  driving forces  behind this renewed interest by  private investors  in
developing  country  economies  is  the  privatization  of  3tate-owned  en:erprises,  which
expanded rapidly over the last years in many developing countries.  In order to  gain a
better  understanding of the relationship between privatizations and foreign investment, a
database was constructed for privatization transactions worldwide for the period 1988-92.
The data were compiled based on information from a wide variety of public sources such
as  newspapers  and  journals,  country  and  regional  departments  as  well  as  residence
missions of the World Bank, and privatization groups and ministries within the individual
countries.  The database  ',omprises about  1,100 transactions  and is available from  the
author upon request.
The study shows that during the period 1988-92, developing country governments earned
almost IJS$62 billion in revenues from the sale of state-owned assets.  About a third of
these revenues came from  foreign sources in the  form of  portfolio  equity and foreign
direct investment.  Measured in sales volume, the largest privatizers are located in Latin
America, which accounts for 66 percent  of total privatizations in the developing world.
European countries, including the Eastern European economies, account for  17 percent,
followed by East Asia with another  13 percent.  The degree of foreign participa  n differs
substantially among countries, but the Eastern  European nations clearly show the most
substantial invoivement of foreign investors compared to other large privatizers, primarily
due to the fundamental lack of domestic investment finance.  But besides being a direct
source of foreign exchange, privatizations also serve as an important vehicle in attracting
additional foreign investments, not directly obtained from  h..e  sale of state-owned assets to
foreigners.  An econometric  analysis shows that  the relative  size of  the  privatization
program as well as the degree of openness to  foreigners are important determinants of
foreign direct investment inflows.  In fact, for the analyzed sample of countries, it turns
out  that  each  dollar in  privatization revenue generates  an  additional 38  cents  in  new
foreign  direct  investment  inflows,  and  that  a  one  percentage  increase  in  foreign
participation adds another  50 cents.  The analysis also  shows that  privatizations in the
financial sector and  infrastructure have a  strongly positive effect  on foreign investors,
while privatizations in manufacturing or services do not appear to attract foreigners to any
significant extent beyond the initial sale of the state-owned enterprises themselves.  Thus,
developing  countries  can use  privatizations as  a  vehicle to  attract  additional foreign
investment in two ways: directly through the sale of assets to foreign investors as well as
by improving the general economic environment such that it appears more profitable for
foreigners to engage in ventures in these countries.
21. Introduction
During  most  of the 1980s,  the inajority  of the developing  countries  were  basically  shut  out
from  the international  capital  markets,  following  the borrowing  binge  of the 1970s  and  the
breakdown  of normal  financial  relations  in 1982/83.  This  financial  constraint,  particularly
severe  for the heavily  indebted  countries,  quickly  translated  into declining  investment
expenditures  and growth  rates  in these  countries. In recent  years,  however,  these same
countries  witnessed  a substantial  increase  in inflows  of equity  capital  in the form of
portfolio  equity  and foreign  direct investment  (FDI), reflecting  a renewed  trust in the
economic  potential  of many developing  countries. FDI alone  rose by almost  US$29
billion  between  1987  and 1992,  reaching  a projected  US$38  billion  last year. Together
with  portfolio  equity  investments  of US$35  billion,  private  investments  in the developing
world  accounted  for  almost  60 percent  of  total  net resource  flows  in 1992.1
This remarkable  turnaround  in private flows is  driven by a  general climate of
macroeconomick  btabilization  and  liberalization,  providing  a more  attractive  environment  to
private  investors.  In most  countries  affected  by the deb' crisis,  stabilization  was  achieved
through  an extensive  program  of sound  macroeconomic  policies  comnbined  with several
rounds  of debt work-outs  with official  and, in particular,  private  creditors. Economic
liberalization  is generally  pursued  via the reduction  of trade restrictions  as well as the
elimination  of distortions  within  the domestic  economy  in order  to improve  internation?l
competitiveness.  For many  countries,  a centerpiece  of this liberalization  effort  is a stroll 
move  towards  privatization  of formerly  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs). After  a relatively
slow  start in the mid-1980s,  privatization  programs  expanded  remarkably  over  the last  five
years  in many  developing  countries  and fueled  a rapid  growth  .n foreign  direct  investment,
supporting  the recovery  in gross  domestio  investment  which  fell substantially  during  the
mid-J  980s.
The existence  of privatization  programs  is generally  acknowledged  as one of the central
reasons  for  the renewed  access  to international  capital  markets  as well  as rising  investment
levels  in developing  countries.  As of yet,  however,  no detailed  study  has been  undertaken
to analyze  the size and extent  of privatizations  and its impact  on capital  inflows  and
investment  levels.  This paper intends  to fill this gap by providing  information  on
privatization  transactions  world-wide  at a micro-level.  A database  was  constructed,  listing
privatization  transactions during the  period 1988-1992 for  all  developing and
industrialized  countries  for which  information  was available.  Based  on this information,
the foreign  exchange  content  of these  tr nsactions  in the form  of foreign  direct  investment
and portfolio  equity  investment  was estimated,  allowing  some  inferences  regarding  the
financial  effects  of the existing  privatization  programs.
The study  shows  that privatizations  grew at an unprece( 4ented  rate in recent years  and
contributed  substantially  to the boom  in foreign  financing  from  private  investors. While
privatization  programs  started  in many countries  during the mid-1980s  already,  they
became  effective  and wide-ranging  not before  the end of the decade. During  the period
i see  World  Debt  Tables  1992-93,  Vo.I,  p.  160.
31988-92, the developing  world wvitnessed  the privatization  of about 870 medium- and
large-sized enterprises, generating a  revenue of  almost $62 billion.  The  strongest
privatizers  were located  in Latin America  and Eastern Europe, while sub-Saharan  African
countries did barely  engage in any significant  sell-offs  of state assets.  Foreign investors
contributed substantially  to this privatization  boom through portfolio eq"ity as well as
foreign  direct investment,  accounting  for about 30 percent of total revenues. But besides
the direct gain of foreign  exch4nge  through  the sale of SOEs, privatizations  also have the
ability  to attract additional  investments  indirectly. It appears  that extensive  privatizations
in infrzstructure  projects and financial  institutions  have a posiiive  effect on foreign  direct
investment  inflows  by enhancing  the profitability  of the economic  environment  for private
ventures.
The following section lays out experiences  with privatizations  in developing countries
prior to  1988 based on previous studies undertaken. In Section III, the data on recent
privatization  transactions  are presented  and analyzed at an aggregate level . The direct
inflows of foreign exchange in the form of foreign direct as well as portfolio equity
investment  resulting  from privatizations  are analyzed  in Section  IV.  Section V describes
privatization  exp.eriences  at the country  level  and provides  a comparison  of the intensity  of
privatizations  among  countries. A more detailed  discussion  of the privatization  programs
in individual  countries  that engaged strongly  in privatizations  is relegated to the Annex.
Besides the direct gains from asset sales to  foreigners, privatizations,  in the areas of
infrastructure  and finance in particular, played an important  role in attracting ?dditional
FDI, as shown in an OLS regression  analysis  in Section  VI.  Section VII concludes  the
study by summarizing  the findings  and discussing  the prospects for privatizations  in the
near  future.
4H. Early  Exoeriencts  with Privatizations
IL1  The  Formation  of State-Owned  Enterprises  (SOEs)
Starting  in  '  early 1960s,  the developing  world witnessed  a steady expansion  of
economic  act{vity  carried  out by the public  sector. Governments  increasingly  intervened
directly  in the economic  process  to suppoit  econormic  development.  Ideological  reasoning
aside,  the primary  arguments  for this economic  strategy  were  based  on efficiency  c,iteria.
Particular  sectors  such  as mining,  petroleum,  telecommunications,  finance,  transportation,
and heavy  industry  were viewed  as central  to the development  strategy  by providing
crucial  goods and services  to all other industries. Governments  hoped to accelerate
eco*nomic  growth by eliminating  bottlenecks  in these crucial areas, enhancinig  the
profitability  and performance  of all other sectors.  Most importantly,  these intended
efficiency  gains  were expected  to translate  into increased  export  earnings,  reducing  the
often  severe  foreign  exchange  constraint.  The export  of raw materials  in the mining  or
hydrocarbons  sectors,  in particular,  were thought  to boost export  performance  directly,
while  the provision  of :ntermediate  goods and services  was expected  to improve  the
comrpetitiveness  of domestic  industries  in  the world  markets.
The  development  of these  core  sectors  was,  however,  generally  quite  unsatisfactory  due to
structural  market  failures  which  impeded  the progress  of the economy  as a whole. In most
cases, the private sector was viewed  as structurally  weak, not having access  to the
necessary  skills and financial  means to provide  these strategically  important  "public
goods". In order  to overcome  these  inadequacies,  the public  sector  began  to carry  out a
steadily  increasing  share of domestic  capital  formation,  reaching  on average  over 45
percent in  1985 in the developing  world. 2 The main instrument  for government
intervention  was  the creation  of SOEs  in those  sectors  deemed  most important. By the
early  1980s,  SOEs  are estimated  to have  accounted  for an average  17 percent  of GDP  in
Su'.  -Saharan  Africa  and around  12 percent  in Latin  America. Asia,  on the other hand,
revealed  a relatively  modest share of only 3  percent (excluding  China, India, and
Myanmar),  while  Eastern  Europe's  SOEs  were responsible  for up to 90 percent  of total
domestic  production. 3
All too often,  however,  the efficiency  cor.;jerations,  initially  used  as an explanation  for
the rapidly  expanding  economic  activities  of the public  sector,  were quickly  replaced  by
short-term  political  goals,  rendering  SOEs  primarily  as large employers  and suppliers  of
highly  subsidized  goods  and services  to the public. Thus,  in many  cases,  SOEs  did not
contribute  significantly  to the long-term  development  process,  being  directed  at quelling
temporary  economic  dissatisfaction  rather  than improvin,g  long-term  economic  efficiency.
Instead of generating  economy-wide  multiplier  effects,  fostering  the development  of
private industry  through  the provision  of essential  services  and raw materials,  they
typically  turned out to be grossly  inefficient,  resulting  in bottlenecks  and generally
2 see  Pfeffermann  and  Madarassay  (1992), Table  4b, p.26.
3see  Kikeri,  Nellis,  and  Shirley  (1992),  p.  15.
5inadequate  and de. iorating infrastnictural  conditions. 4 The social  benefits  resulting  from
the provision  of subsidized  goods and services  to the public  in the form of staple goods,
energy,  transportation and  others  became an  increasing financial burden  to  the
governments,  when many of these SOEs incurred substantial  financial  losses, draining
resources  from the budget  as well as the domestic  financiai  markets. In 1982,  the Mexican
government had to spend 4 percent of its GNP in transfers and subsidies  to  its SOEs.
During 1989 to  1991, SOE losses are estimated  to have reached 9 percent of GDP in
Argentina  and, on avei  - over 5 percent  in Sub-Saharan  African  countries. 5
SOEs also generally  failed to enhance export growth and to  provide the country with
additional  foreign  exchange. )n  ,ie contrary,  with relatively  easy access  to foreign  capital
during  the lending  boom of the 1970s,  SOEs  absorbed  a substantial  amount of loans  taken
on in the international  financial  markets,  rendering  them a substantial  contributor to the
ballooning  of sovereign  debt during  the 1970s.  With cieditors e.fectively  treating them as
part of  the goverment based or.  public  guarantees  issued  by the authorities,  SOEs coL;d
obtain loans independent  of their economic  pe.formance. Hence, during the period of
1970 to  1982, the real stock of debt of SOQ.s  grew at an average annual rate of 10.8
percent, comnared to an average 7.4 percent growth of Non-SOE debt, reaching $164
billion  at con-cant  1991 dollars,  or 23.6 percent of the total stock of debt.  Servicing  the
old debt proved to be a heavy  burden  for the governnents: SOE debt alone accour:ted  for
almost 30 percent of total debt service. Creditors  managed  to avoid extensive  defaults  by
continuously  rescheduling  the outstanding  debt.  Within  this process almost $100 billion
liad to  be  rescheduled, accounting for  16.5 percent of  total  reschedulings for the
developing world.  With SOEs being unable to  service their  debt  and  requiring
reschedulings, public guarantees became reality in  the  sense that  the  government
effectively  had to take over the rescheduled  portion of the SOE debt, further increasing
the  stoclz of public debt and exacerbating  the  debt burden for the governments of
developing  countries. 6
Confronted with the generally disappointing  performance of  the  SOEs and the dire
financial straits, many developing countries found themselves in  during the  1980s,
privatization  became an important economic policy  tool  n many developing  countries.
The transfer of ownership  is generally  hoped to improve the efficiency  with wh,ich  these
strategically  important  goods and services  are provided,  forcing  the firms  to ifolow market
signals by eliminating  the existing soft budget constraints.  Equally important, maiiy
governments  hope to  reduce budgetary pressures resulting from subsidies  and tra,isfer
payments,  while  at the same  time generating  revenues  as well  as foreign  exchange  through
the sale of these assets.
4 For  an example  in the  case  of  Latin  America  see  World  Bank  (1991).
5  Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley  (1992),  P. 15.
6Based  on  the World  Bank's  Debt Reporting  System  (DRS).
611.2  The Early Phase  of Privatizations
The  beginnings  of pri',atization  programs,  defined z  a systematic  strategy by the public
sector to withdraw from direct economnic  activity, is usually associated  with the United
Kingdom and Chile as the two most outstanding cases.  In both countries, the initial
motivation was primarily ideological and politic&!  in the  sense that the government
intended to return to private ownership assets tlrit tve!' nreviously nationalized.
In  the  United Kingdom, an  ext  en3ive privatization program was  initiated by  the
Conservative  Party shortly aRer its ele 'zon in )979.  The general goal.  .ere to reduce
government  involverr?nt  in commercial activities, widen  private  share  o-wnership, and
raise government  revenue to help finance  a notorious budget deficit. A large number of
well-known companies were transferred to  private ownership, among them British
Petroleum,  British  Gas, British  Telecom,  British ;.'-Cays, Jaglar, Rolls  Royce, and Cable
&  Wireless  Over  the  last  13 year2 it  is  estintn-t1 that  thii country has  raised
approximately  $65 billion  through  privatizations. 7
Chile developed probably the  most  eteisW..e pniv,tra.tion program  in  the  world.
According  to  one estimate, Chiie has transtf&-ed  .wice tV.e  value of state-owned assets
relative to GNP coinpared to the U.K^. 8 The progilim was started in 1974 under the
rilitary  regime of General Pinociiet as a  eaaction  to  the socialist government under
Salvador Allende who during 1970-7/. nationq.al...,1  about 350 enterprises, giving the
government  control over approximraely  600 enterprises  accounting  for almost 50 percent
of GDP. 9 In the first two years, around 240 -,nterprises  were returned to their previous
owners, and by 1983 another 1  10 er.rprises  h,A been divested. Duiring  this time, only
around  US$1 billion  was raised  in revei,ue,  because,  in most cases, the assets were simply
returned without anv official  sjes  transaction. Following  the financial  shock of the debt
crisis, whlich  led to  ar  increased iiivolvement  of the state by bailing out many large
financial  and industrial  cor-donwerates,  a final phase of privatization began in 1985.  Since
then, Chile has divested most of the remaining 40 large industrial enterprises under state
control, predominantly via the sale of shares, gerierating a total revenue of approximately
$1.4 bil,ion.
For  the  overwhelming majority of developing countries,  however,  the  recent  trend  in
privatizations was not based on particular ideological reasoning, but rather initiated out of
economic  necessity. Given  the stringent  financial  constraints  most countries  faced during
the 1980s, ways had to be found to relieve the already strained budget from any additional
pressures.  Clearly, one of the first items on the list were transfers and subsidies to SOEs,
a move strongly supported bv  tl e multilateral  organizations. In most structural adjustment
programs  by  the  IMF  as  well as  the  adjustment  loans  made  by  the  World  Bank,  a
reduction  of  SCE  sUppoit paymenrts,  combined  with pricing at  operating  costs  and  a
general deregulation were envisaged.10  These adjustment programs  were oflen heavily
7 Euromoney,  1992,  p.3.
8 The Financial  Times, April 1  1, 1990.
9 Nankani (1988), p.18.
10  see International  Monetar)  Fund (1985),  and Mosley  (1988).
7Contested  in the political arena of the developing  country concerned.  A reduction of
public  expenditure  combined  with the elimnination  of subsidies  on basic  goods and services
affected  predominant6y  th, lower income  groups  who are disproportionately  dependent  on
the provision of subsidized  public services. Large price incre.asts  on staple goods and
essential services such at transportation effectively  meant a Lurther  rdjuction in living
standards in  an  environrne't of  economic decline and  rising unemployment.  rhe
"medtiling"  with the public sector as the last economic  stronghold  for a large poltion of
the population  proved to be a potential  social explosive,  rendering  the implementation  of
public sector reforms politically dangerous.  Thus, attempts to  establish extensive
privatization  piograms all too often  tot bogged down in drawn-out political debates,
resulting  in a iather slow  take-off of .ivatizations until  the late 1980s.
However, despite these political problems,  quite a  substantial  number . f SOEs were
already  privatized  during  the period 1980-87. In a recent  Worid Bank study analyzing  the
techniques  of SoE privatizationsl  1, Candoy-Sekse  compiled  information  on privatization
transactions worldwide for this time period.  While the provided information  is very
detailed  for the 83 countries  included,  some essential  data are unfortunately  missing. In
particul^r,  information  on the date of the transaction  as well  as its size in terms of the sale
amount is usually not provided.  Thus, it is impossible to determine the privatization
volume and to  track its development  over time, only allowing for a  comparison of
countries based on the aggregate number of transactions. This, of course, carries the
danger that  individual countries are  misrepresented  if  compared by the  number of
transactions,  given  that the importance  of each privatization  program  relative  to the size of
the economy  cannot be eetermined. Furthermore,  Candoy-Sekse  herself  points out "that
the  information provided is  uneven"  12,  depending on  the  availability  of  data  from
government  sources  or World  Bank  reports.
But despite  these caveats,  some  interesting  inferences  can be made regarding  the extent of
privatizations  during 1980-87. The study lists a total of  696 completed privatiz.  +;on
transactions,  456 of which were carried out in the 64 developing  countries included.
According  to these data, Sub-Saharan  Afiica and Latin America  and the Caribbean,  two
regions with a stro,.g record of government  involvement  in economic  activity,  were the
most intensive  privatizers  during  the period. Europe and Central Asia had practically  no
privatizations  due to the fact that Eastern Europe  at that time still  had a centrally  planned
economic  system.  ;he  la;gest privatizers  in Sub-Saharan  Africa ware Guinea with 40
transactions,  follow-d by Cote d'Ivoire with 36, Togo with 17, and Niger with 14.  In
Latin America,  Chiz. .eads the list with 40 individual  privatizations,  followed  by  Jamaica
with 34, Brazil  with 29, and Mexico  with 10.
With respect to the sectoral  distribution  of privatization  transactions,  agribusiness  clearly
dominates with over  100 transactions,  followed by services with 70 transactions and
manufacturing  with another 55.  It is interesting  to note that these three sectors account
for a total of  50 percent of the total number of transactions,  while energy, finance,
II Candoy-Sekse  (1988).
12ibid.,  p.vii
8transport,  and hydrocarbons,  which  accounted!  for 90 percent of the SO1 stock of debt in
1986, had a combined share of only 21 percent of all completed privatization  projects
during the period 1980-87. It thus seems  that during thJs period most countries  had not
yet managed  to rid themselves  from the most prevalent  pressure stemming  from the public
enterprise sector  but rather engaged in privatizing  other, relatively minor government-
owned assets, possibly as  the  first timid steps  toward extensive and  economically
meaningful  privatization  programs.
Table 1: GLOBAL  PRIVATIZATION 'RANSACTIONS,  1980-1987
by number  of transactiort
Sub-Saharan  South  East Asia  Latin Amerioa Europe  &  Middle  East & Subtotal  Industrialized  TOTAL
Sector  Atrica  Asia  & Paclfio  & Caribbean Central  Asla  North Africa  Countries
Agribusineas  63  2  1  27  0  9  102  2C  122
Chemicals  6  1  0  7  0  0  14  5  19
Energy  1  0  0  6  0  0  7  6  13
Finance  4  2  3  26  0  0  35  27  32
Heavy  Industry  '1  1  5  4  0  1  23  6  29
Hydrocarbons  7  0  2  2  0  1  12  1  6  28
Menufacturing  24  4  7  17  0  3  55  56  111
Mining  4  1  0  4  0  3  12  2  14
Services  31  0  ' 1  22  0  6  70  26  96
Telecommunication  0  1  1  5  2  0  9  13  22
Transport  13  1  10  9  0  2  35  35  70
others  19  0  55  7  0  1  S`2  28  110
ITOTAL  184  13  95  136  2  26  456  240  696
S.wce: R.hcca Candoy-Se*a.. rchnhcuss  of Prvetizfton of Srats-Owned  Enterprise.s  Vo/l/, Woed  Bank  Trchnkei  Arpew  N.  9',  Washkinton.  D.C. ISI
Note:  others' of 6G  for  Enst Asia & Pacific rewts  from  Privatuation4  in the Philippines, which  were only cted  in the aggregate.
However, as already indicated,  this comparison  of countries based on the number of
privatization  transactior.s  alone is misleading,  not reflecting  the size and irrortance  of
individual  transactions  for each country  and in comparison  among  countries. The fact that
Sub-Saharan  Africa turns out to be the region with the strongest privatization  efforts
during  this period appears  counterintuitive  given  the observation  in recent  years, as will be
seen in the following  section.  Taking into account that the vast majority  of concluded
privatization  projects occurred in agribusiness  indicates that the information  includes a
substantial  number of small-scale  privatizations  with assets of very low absolute value.
Thus, while  the privatization  effort in certain  countries  might look impressive  in terms of
the actual number of transactions completed,  it is very likely that the actual economic
impact  of these privatizations  was relatively  sma!l.
9mH. The Recent Wave  of Privatizations.  1988-1992
11.1 The Datn
In order to  evaluate the magnitude of privatizations  in recent years, a  database was
compiled  at a micro-level  for the period 1988-1992,  which  is presented  in the Appendix  in
Tables  A-1 and A-2. In general,  the data are based on publicly  available  information  from
numerous sources ranging  from newspaper  and joumal articles  to direct information  from
privatization agencies and m.nistries as  well as  country operations, regional support
groups, and resident  missions  within  the World  Bank.  13
For the purpose of this study,  privatizations  are defined  as the transfer  of productive  assets
from the public  to the private  sector involving  some type of sale agreement. This includes
all direct sales of public  assets to private investors  in the form of public  offers or private
sales. It also includes  the contracting  out of government  services  through concessions  or
licensing agreements. Any divestitures  of SOEs in the form of simply shutting down
operations  and mothballing  assets,  on the other hand,  are not included. This should  not be
interpreted as implying  that such mothballing  are considered unimportant. In fact, the
benefits  of shutting  down inefficient  enterprises  can be substantial  in the long-run  through
the elimination  of sectoral  distortions  as well  as through  the alleviation  of budget  pressures
resulting fro.n  subsidy and transfer payments for the  purpose of  covering losses.
Typically,  however, this strategy is restricted to relatively  minor operations with small
asset value, thus not contributing  significantly  to the evaluation  of privatization  programs
when measured  in monetary  units.  In addition,  data on this type of divestitures  are not
easy to come by and, even if available,  are far from comprehensive.
Some warnings regarding the interpretation  of these data are necessary.  First of all,
despite  the  already extensive list  of  individual transactions, any  claims regarding
completeness  of this data set cannot possibly  be made. For one, it can be expected that
many small-scale  privatizations  have been carried  out by governments  which are not listed
here, because individual  transaction  information  is plain not available. For the sake of
consistency, projects with a  sales value of  less than $50,000 were excluded, even if
information  was available. In addition,  some  countries  might  not appear in the list, despite
having carried out privatization  projects, simply  having escaped the author's attention.
This  might be  true  in  particular for  some Sub-Saharan African countries, whose
privatization  programs are in terms of monetary units so small in comparison  to  other
countries, that the,  are usually not mentioned in standard sources.  With respect to
individual  transaction  information,  great care has been taken to verify and update all data.
However,  for many  projects certain  pieces  of information  could not be obtained. In some
cases,  it  was  also  impossible to  distinguish between sales  price  and  committed
investments. Especially  in the case of Eastern Europe, privatization  contracts are often
written such that the buyer  commits  to a certain  amount of future investments  besides  the
actual cash transfer  for the purchased  asset itself  This makes it difficult  to determine  the
13 For more information  on data sources  and details  on data compilation  and estimation  refer to the
Appendix.
10actual sale price as well as the timing of the actual inflow of cash revenue.  While
additional  informnation  could be obtained  in the cases of Hungary  and Poland to, at least
partially,  correct for this problem, no better information  was as of yet available  for the
former  Czechoslovakia.
m.2  Global Trends in Privatizations
Over the period 1988-1992,  the number  of annua!  privatizations  worldwide  grew rapidly
from 62 in 1988 to almost 480 in 1992, generating a total cash revenue for the public
sector of almost $185 billion  in a total of slightly  over 1,100  transactions. Not included
here are privatizations  in the former  East Germany. According  to the Treuhandanstalt,  the
German state agency responsible  for privatizations,  a total of 11,043 entities  were sold
between 1990 and  end-1992 for about $25 billion with an additional $106 billion in
investment  comnmitments.
The expansion  in the number  of privatization  transactions  carried out clearly  stems from
the developing  world, where various sizable privatization  programs began to  take off
during  this time. Revenues  also increased  steadily,  and by 1992,  the public  sectors of the
developing  world had earned $61.6 billion  in about 870 privatizations. For industrialized
countries, on the other hand, the list of completed privatization  projects grew at a far
slower pace, reaching  67 recorded  transactions  in 1992. One oh-ious reason for this is
that the number  of entities  in public  hands is far smaller  in industrialized  countries. Their
asset value, however, is on average significantly  larger: a total of around 250 projects
generated  a total revenu^-  of about $123 billion,  resulting  in an average  revenue  per project
of almost $600 million,  compared to less than $85 million  in the developing  world.' 4 In
1992, however,  the total snies  volume in developing  economies  of $23.2 billion  was, for
the first time, larger than the revenues generated by  privatizations  in  industrialized
countries  ($17.3 billion).
But revenues in industrialized  countries are generally  quite erratic over time, being to a
large extent dependent  on the size of the relatively  small number  of individual  projects
carried out by industrialized  countries  each year.  Thus, revenues  are extraordinarily  high
in 1988  for the simple  reason that the Japaniese  government  decided  to sell 9.6 percent of
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone for $22.8 billion, accounting for over half of total
privatization  revenues in the world that year.  In 1991, the United Kingdom  privatized
British  Telecommunications  for almost  $10 billion  as well  as four major  power utilities  for
an additional  $9 billion,  generating  another  boom  in privatization  revenues.
The U.K. also is still the strongest  privatizer  in the industrialized  world, having  privatized
62 entities during the period with a strong focus on power and water utilities, which
accounted for over 56 percent of the total  $48 billion generated in revenue.  Other
particularly  strong privatizers  in the industrialized  world are Canada  with 25 transactions
14 For  the purpose  of this calculation,  only  transactions  were taken into account  for which information
about the sales price was available.
11for $5.7 billion,  Italy with 17 projects  for $6.6 billion,  New Zealand also with 17 projects
for $6.3 billion,  and Australia  with 15 transactions  for $6.2 billion.
Figure I  GLOBAL  PRIVATLZATIONS,  1988-1992
By Number  of Transactions
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ITI.2  Trends  in Developing  Country  Privatizations
In developing  countries,  privatizations  increased  drastically  over the last five years, both in
terms of the number of transaction'q as well as in revenue.  The number of transactions
rose from a  meager 26  in  1988 to  416 in  1992, and, over the  same time period,
privatization  revenues increased from $2.6 billion  to  $23.2 billion,  implying  an average
nomninal  growth rate of about 73 percent per year
While privatization  programs are generally  becoming more popular and expand rapidly,
the developments  differ  quite substantially  across regions. In the region  Middle East and
Northern  Africa, only Tunisia  showed  any substantial  privatization  activity, Sub-Saharan
Africa  has generally not  to  any  major extent participated in  the  recent wave  of
privatizations  and progress has been very slow.  While some countries  engaged in not
insubstantial  privatization  programs  in terms of number  of transactions,  the asset value of
the SOEs involved  is overall  only marginal  with the exception  of two sales in South Africa
during 1989. Over the period as a whole, 76 transactions  could be recorded for a total
volume of about $240 million  or only a meager 0.4 percent of total sales revenues  in the
developing world. 5  For East Asia and  the Pacific,  no transactions could be found for
15 Excluding South  Africa  with two  transactions  worth  US$1.4  billion  in 1989.
121988,  but the number  of completed  privatizations  infreased,  reaching  20 in 1992 for $3.8
billion. While  the number oa'  transactions  was not particularly  large, the average asset
value of the individual  projects  was quite large, resulting  in a total revenue  of $7.8 billion
over the period as a whole. In comparison,  1992 was the year for privatizations  in South
Asia.  While  only a small  number of SOEs were sold in the previous  years, 1992 saw an
explosive  growth in privatization  transactions  because of strong activity in Pakistan and
Sri Lanka,  reaching  69 privatizations. Most of the companies  sold were, however,  only of
small  value, resulting  in a total revenue  of not more than $0.6 billion. But the strongest
growth in privatization  transactions  was, not surprisingly,  found in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia.  In  1992, 173 SOEs were sold for a total revenue of $4.3 billion. 16
Privatization programs in Latin America and the Caribbean  expanded steadil  '  .r the
last years and are certainly  the most successful  in the developing  world in terms  # enue
generated, with a peak of $17.9 billion in 1991.  In  1992, the sales voiur,-  a.Jine.i
slightly,  but was still  substantial  with about $14.6 billion.
Figure 2  PRIVATIZATIONS  IN THE DEVELOPING  WORLD
by geographic  region, 1988-1992
By  Number  of Transactions
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16  Note that small-scale  mass  pnvatizations, in particular  for the case of the former  Czechoslovakia,  are
not included  here because  disaggregated  data were  simply  not available.  Government  sources  indicate,
however,  that the government  received  slightly  less than $300 million  through the voucher scheme  for the
privatization  of 1491  small enterprises. But she also argues  that this scheme  was irrelevant  from a
budgetary  point of view, with the proceeds  being used  to cover  the expenses  of running the scheme.
13A comparison  of the regions over the last five  years points  to some  interesting  differences.
The massive  privatizations  in Eastern Europe resulted in a total number of transaction of
373 for Europe and Central Asia, but only $10.6 billion  in revenue  were generated.  17 In
general,  the average  asset value in Eastern Europe is significantly  smaller relative  to other
middle  income  countries,  rendering  these privatization  programs  far less attractive  from a
budgetary  perspective. But, of course, revenue  generation  only plays a secondary  role in
the effort to restructure  the economic  system  as a whole. Privatizations  in these countries
primarily served as  a  mechanism to  support the  transfornation  process by  rapidly
expanding private ownership, even if at the expense of government revenues.  Latin
America,  on the other hand, privatized  a total of 266 entities  for $40.9 billion  during  the
period, providing the  governments concerned with substantial amounts of  additional
income.
Figure 3  PRIVATIZATIONS  IN THE DEVELOPING  WORLD,  1988-1992
Aggregated  by Geographic  Region
Prooeeds  hi  USS  Bilion  Number  of  Transactions
50  - 400
10- Transactions|
4  0 -,  ..  ....  ..  ..  ..  ...............  ...  ..  ...  '  I




10  - . ..  . .
0  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
Europe  and  Latin  America East  Asia  and  South  Asia  Sub-Saharan North  Africa  £
Central  Asia  and Caribbean  Pacific  Africa  Middle  East
In terms of econonic sectors,  privatizations  in infrastructure,  which includes  electric and
water utilities,  transportation,  and telecommunications,  are clearly  dominating,  accounting
for  34 percent of  total  revenues for the  developing world as  a  whole.  Industrial
production, comprising  chemical production,  heavy industry, and manufacturing  is the
second most important  sector. having  generated  a fifth  of total revenues. Privetizations  of
financial  institutions was also very strong during the period, accounting for almost 26
percent, resulting primarily from the re-privatization  of  commercial  banks that were
nationalized  in many countries  during  the early stages of the debt crisis. With respect to
the primary sector, privatizations  were relatively  strong in petroleum-related  activities.
The number of mining transactions was relatively  minor, and while a not insignificant
17  Excluding  Portugal  and Turkey,  the only non-Eastern  European  countries  in the group, 294  entities
were privatized  for a total of only  $5.7 billion.
14number of agribusinesses  were sold by  developing country governments, they were
typically  small  in terms of asset value.
Figure  4  PRIVATIZATIONS  IN THE DEVELOPING  WORLD
By Sector, 1988-1992
All  Developing  Countries
(Total  Revenue:  $61.6  Bn)
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But again,  these trends differ quite substantially  among geographic  regions.  Given that
Latin America and the  Caribbean represents two  thirds of  worldwide privatization
revenues,  the sectoral  distribution  in this region is very similar  to the global one.  Due to
the privatization  of large telecommunication  entities  in Argentina,  Mexico, and Venezuela,
as well as the sale of numerous  utilities  and transportation  enterprises,  particularly  by the
Argentine government, infrastructural  privatizations  amounted  to  14.5 billion or  34
percent of the total. Mexico  privatized  the entire  banking  sector during 1991  and 1992  for
a total of $12 billion, making privatizations  in financial  services particularly  important,
accounting  for over 30 percent of total revenues. Privatizations  in industry  of almost  $10
billion  were boosted by the sale of the Brazilian  Usiminas  for around $1.5 billion  in 1991.
The quite sizable  amount of revenue  through sales of primary sector enterprises  resulted
foremost from the privatization  of large stakes of petroleum-  and gas-related  activities  in
Brazil and, especially,  in Argentina,  as well as from the privatization  of Mexicana de
Cobre in 1988  for almost  $1.4 billion.
Privatization  revenues in East Asia and the Pacific are overwhelmingly  dominated by
infrastructural  projects, accounting  for almost  four fifth  of the total sales revenue of $7.8
billion  during the period. The largest  projects  in this area were one energy  utility in South
Korea for $2.1 billion as well as several largc utility and telecommunications  projects in
Malaysia  for a total of $3.9 billion. Sales  of manufacturing  enterprises  as the second most
important  sector accounted  for only 9 percent of total revenue.
Privatizations  in South  Asia are only minor  in asset value,  amounting  to only $600 million
or 7 percent of total revenues  for all of Asia.  But in terms of numbers of transactions,
significant  programs exist in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and to a smaller extent also in India.
15The sell-off of manufacturing  enterprises amounted to  almost half of total revenues,
followed  by the primary  sector, which  accounted  for another quarter.
Eastern Europe and Central Asia differs quite significantly  from other regions in the
sectoral  composition of  its  privatizations.  Infrastructure projects are  marginal,
representing  less than 3 percent of total revenues. Industry  with almost 54 percent of the
total is by far the strongest sector.  Eastern Europe alone carried out  around 150
transactions in chemical production, heavy industry, and manufacturing.  In addition,
Turkey  actively  pursued a privatization  of its cement  producing  industry,  which  generated
almost  60 percent of its total privatization  revenue.
In  Sub-Saharan Africa  (excluding South Africa), revenues from privatization were
relatively  low, adding  up to only $250 million  over the five years. Privatization  in industry
and services being the  most relevant transactions, amounting to  44  percent of total
revenue. In comparison  to the other regions  it is especially  noteworthy  that practically  no
infrastructural  projects  have  been privatized.
Privatizations  in North Africa and the Middle East are determined  by the sales of the
Tunisian  government during the period.  Two thirds of total revenues were generated
through  the sale of large hotel complexes,  followed  by another 30 percent from the sale of
various  manufacturing  enterprises  of only  minor  asset value.
Figure 5  SECTORAL  DISTRIBUTION  OF PRIVATIZATIONS  IN THE
DEVELOPING  WORLD
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1 6IV. Privatizations  as a Source  of Foreign  Exchange
IV.1 Data
Foreign investors can participate in privatization transactions through foreign direct
investment  or portfolio  equity  investment. In the case of portfolio  equity  investment,  the
foreign buyer engages in a  purely financial investment with the indivi  eal  share not
exceeding 10 percent.  For an investment to qualify as foreign direct investment, the
investor has to acquire 10 percent or more and is usually  interested in having, at least,
substantial  influence  over the operations  of the company.
Privatization  transactions involving  portfolio equity investments  are rare, but typically
quite large in volume. Henec, this information  is generally  well documented  and easily
available. In most cases, hc -ever, foreign  investors tend to be more interested  in direct
investments,  allowing  them to shape  the future of the enterprise  bought,  as independent  as
possible from interests of local groups, including the  state.  Information about the
participation  of foreign buyers in  privatization  programs including  their share in the
purchase  is typically  not readily  available,  especially  not at a disaggregated  level. Hence,
in cases where no additional  information  could be obtained,  the amount of foreign  direct
investment  resulting  from privatizations  had to be estimated  based on the nationality  of the
buyer. If no information  was at all available  regarding  the buyer's  identity,  it was assumed
that the investor was local, involving  no foreign  investment. In this respect, the foreign
exchange  values obtained  are a lower  bound of actual inflows. On the other hand,  inflows
are possibly overestimated  in cases where committed investments  were included  in the
purchasing  price. Especially  in Eastern European  transactions,  contracts are often written
such that future investments  are included. While adjustments  could be made based on
additional information in  the  cases  of  Hungary  and  Poland,  the  numbers  for
Czechoslovakia  have  to be taken with a grain of salt due to data limitations.
IV.2 Overall Trends
The involvement  of foreign investors in privatization  programs is sought after by most
governments  despite  - often strong - political  opposition,  fighting  against  the "selling  out"
of domestic  interests. However, the participation  of foreign investors is often essential,
particularly  for large projects, because the local capital market is too thin and needed
technological  and managerial  expertise is not available. Furthermore,  the sale of such
assets promises  the receipt of sizable  amounts  of foreign  exchange,  needed  in a situation
of limited access to foreign capital.  But in order to attract foreigners, the privatizing
authorities  first have to prove their political  willingness  and commitment  to an extensive
privatization effort, characterized by a  reliable and transparent system of  rules and
regulations. Hence, during  the take-off  period, most privatization  programs  do not show
any extensive foreign participation,  but over time the number of foreign buyers rises
quickly,  should  the program  prove reliable.
17While  foreign investors  only participated  in 8 operations in 1988, they were involved  in
200 by 1992 and a total of 392 over the whole period. A total of $18.5 billion  in foreign
exchange  was generated  during  this time,  with a peak of $8.8 billion  in 1991, representing
40 percent of the total revenue  from privatizations  that year.
Figure  6  FOREIGN  PARTICIPATION  IN DEVELOPING  COUNTRY
PRIVATIZATIONS,  1988-1992
By  Number  of Transactions
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Due  to  the  lack  of  domestic  savings,  Eastern  Europeani countries  were  especially
dependent  on the participation  of foreign  investors,  who  paid a total of $5.3 billion  for 194
enterprises  during  1988-92 which  amounts to  over  90  percent  of the  total  revenues
generated. 18
Latin America clearly was the region that managed to attract the largest amount of foreign
exchange through its privatization effort since 1988, amounting to 64 percent of foreign
exchange from privatizations in the developing world.  1991 was the peak year for the
region with almost $6.8 billion in foreign exchange, primarily due to the privatization of
large  telecommunication  units  in  Argentina,  Mexico,  and  Venezuela.  On  average,
Is Including  Portugal  and Turkey,  207  companies  were  privatized  in Europe  and Central  Asia  with  a
foreign  exchange  content  of $5.9  billion,  amounting  to 56  percent.  Also  note  that  the  share  of  foreign
exchange  in total  rcvenue  in Eastern  Europe  is slightly  exaggerated  by the fact  that revenues  from small-
scale  and mass  privatizations  are  excluded.
18foreigners provided more than a quarter of the total privatization  revenues during the
period.
While foreign participation  in East Asian privatizations  rose quickly over the last two
years, overall  it was not particularly  strong with only 18 projects  during 1988-92. Foreign
privatization  investments  provided only about $0.7 billion in foreign exchange, slightly
more than 8 percent of total revenues.
South Asian privatizers received a  total  of  52 million from foreign investors in  17
transactions during the period.  While the amounts involved appear rather small, it is
interesting  to note that 11 of these 17 sales with foreign  participation  occurred in 1992,
showing  a strong  upward trend.
In absolute  terms,  the foreign  exchange  inflow  into Sub-Saharan  Africa was only marginal
with a total of about $100 million  for the whole period, in 21 transactions  with foreign
participation,  reflecting  the small  average  asset value of the SOEs  sold. As a share of total
revenues, however, foreign investors still contributed an average 37 percent (excluding
South Africa).
North Africa and the Middle East had barely any foreign  participation  in privatizations.
During the five year period, only four transactions  involving  foreign investors could be
recorded. Only about US$27 million  were generated  this way, dominated  by the sale of
three Tunisian  hotels to a French and Swiss  investor  group for US$19.2  million  in 1992.
Table  2  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE  AS SHARE  OF TOTAL  REVENUE
(in  percent)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  AVG
Europe  & Central  Asia  80.58  55.59  36.10  55.81  63.04  55.73
Latin America & Caribbean  8.21  43.91  37.80  38.44  16.75  28.85
East Asia &  Pacific  0.00  0.00  0.00  19.46  12.99  8.36
South Asia  0.00  3.85  36.18  3.54  8.42  8.79
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.00  34.67  47.19  1.14  35.91  36.73
North Africa & Middle  East  0.00  7.09  0.00  18.82  35.27  25.£7
TOTAL  9.34  20.86  33.40  40.23  24.64  30.72
Note:  Foreign  exchange  is composed  of portfolio  equity  and foreign  direct investment.
IV.3 Portfolio Equity Investments
Financial  investments  in developing  country companies  can be made either directly by
buying a  small share in a  company or  by purchasing equity instruments, traded in
international  security  markets. The most commonly  used instruments  are so-called  ADRs
(American  Depository Receipts) and GDRs (Global Depository Receipts).  ADRs are
negotiable equity-based irstruments publicly traded in  the  U.S.  securities markets,
attracting  U.S. investors  who are legally  limited  in their capability  of directly  investing  in
foreign  stock markets such as several  institutional  investors. GDRs function exactly  like
19ADRs with the additional feature that they can be traded simultaneously  in different
securities  exchanges  all over the world.  19
With respect to privatization  transactions,  such instruments  were used extensively  in the
sale of large Latin American  telecommunications  companies. Chile  was the first country
to use equity  instruments  in July  of 1990  for the sale of the remaining  part of Tdlefonos  de
Chile.  $98 Million in instruments  were offered at the New York Stock Exchange and
represented  the first international  equity offering  by any Latin American  country for 25
years. 20 In  1991, Argentina was the  first country to  make use  of  GDRs in  thf
privatization  of Telefonica  de Argentina,  issuing securities  for a nominal  value of $364
Million. In March 1992, Argentina  issued  $270.3  Million  in ADRs  and GDRs for the sale
of 30 percent in Telecom  Argentina. The largest  single  issue of ADRs  was carried out by
Mexico  in May 1991, when the remaining  15 percent of Telefonos  de Mexico  (TELMEX)
were privatized  for a total of $2.4 billion. A year later, TELMEX  offered another $1.2
billion in ADRs.  In addition,  Mexico issued GDR. worth $638 Million in 1991 in the
privatization  of its largtst bank Bancomer, which sold for a total of $2.5 billion.  In
February  of 1992, Veneziela also issued GDRs worth $1  10.5 Million  when it privatized
Sider4rgica  Venezolana.
But securities  issues  in privatization  transactions  were not limited  to Latin  America. Since
end-1991, China allows foreigners  to buy non-voting "B"-shares  in a small number of
companies,  offered  by the government  in the stock exchanges  of Shanghai  and Shenzhen.
Up to end-1992  such "B"-shares  were offered  for 11 companies,  generating  almost $280
million  in foreign  equity investments. While  the termn  "privatization  is not officially  used
by the Chinese governnent, these transactions  effectively  represent  a transfer of partial
ownership  in assets from the public  sector into private hands.
Direct  portfolio  investment,  in which  an investor  acquires  a minority  share  in an enterprise,
is rather unusual. While  good information  on this type of investmcnt  is difficult  to obtain,
three cases were recorded. The largest case was the partial privatization  of TELMEX  in
1990,  when Southwestern  Bell and France Telecom  each acquired  5 percent of the stock
for a total of  about $860 million. In the case of  the Brazilian  Usiminas,  one of the
country's  largest steel producers  which  was privatized  in 1991, foreign  investors  bought a
stake of only 6 percent for approximately  $90 million. When Hungary  sold 56 percent of
the state-owned travel agency IBUSZ, foreign financial  interests participated with 41
percent  for around $13 million.
In general,  21 transactions  were recorded for the period 1988-92  qualifyinf as portfolio
equity  investment  for a total $4 billion. This amounts  to 8.5 percent of total privatization
revenues  for the developing  world and almost  28 percent of total foreign  exchange  inflows
resulting  from privatization  transactions. Furthermore,  in some cases such as TELMEX
or Aerovias  de Mexico,  which  was privatized  in 1988 and issued  equity  securities  in 1991,
these newly privatized  companies  made use of the rapidly growing portfolio investment
market by issuing  additional  securities. Hence, inflows  in the form of equity investment9
19  see  Gooptu  (1993),  pp.21f.
20  ibid.,  p.52.
20can be expected  to grow further in the near future, directly  through additional  large-scale
privatizations and  indirectly through follow-up equity issues by  already privatized
companies.
IV.4 Foreign Direct Investment
Direct  investment  (FDI) was clearly  the most common  vehicle  used by foreign  investors  in
privatization transactions, especially in  sma!l- and  medium-sized  transactions.  FDI
accounted  for the remaining  371 recorded privatizations  with foreign  participation  during
1988-1992,  worth $14.5 billion. Hence, privatizations  were certainly  one of the reasons
underlying  the rapid increase  in FDI over the last five years, accounting  for an average  of
abl,ut 11 percent of total FDI to the developing  world during  the period.
Europe and Central  Asia received  the largest  share of its FDI inflows  from privatizatiors,
reaching an average of almost 32 percent during the period.  This reflects the strong
dependence  of the transforming  economies  in Eastern Europe on privatizations  as the main
vehicle  to attract foreign investors. While the available  FDI information  generally  does
not appear very reliable for the Eastern European countries 21,  they seemed to  have
received  almost  85 percent  of their FDI from the sale of their SOEs.
Latin American countries showed a strong growth in privatization  revenues stemming
from foreign  investors,  in particular  during 1990 and 1991,  when privatizations  accounted
for over a quarter of total FDI flows.  Over the period as a whole, privatization  FDI still
accounted for over  16 percent.  Especially in the cases of Argentina and Venezuela,
privatization  FDI was particularly  strong, accounting for a share of 36 percent and 41
percent respectively  over the period (see Table A-4).  Mexico,  on the other hand, as the
strongest  privatizer  of the region in terms of sales volume,  only showed an average share
of slightly  more than 5 percent, primarily  because  the sizable  privatization  of the banking
sector during 1991  and 1992  was for all practical  purposes limited  to domestic  investors,
generating  no FDI inflows  at all.
In East Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan  Africa and North Africa and the Middle East,
privatizations  only contributed  marginally  to FDI inflows. For one, no indication  could be
found that foreign participation in the  existing privatization programs is particularly
strong.  This is due to the fact that in many countries strong restrictions are imposed
regarding  the participation  of foreigners  in privatizations.  In East Asian countries,  on the
other hand, FDI flows have been very large over the last years, rendering privatization
transactions  marginal. In addition,  the capital  markets in these countries are already so
21 For  HLugary,  for example,  the IMF  does not  report any FDI inflows until 1991, uhilc  privatization
transactions  with  foreign  participation  are recorded  since  1989.
21strong, that a participation  of. foreign  investors  is not essential  in order to obtain  an
adequate  price for SOEs.
Table  3  FOREIGN  DIRECT  INVESTMENT  FROM PRIVATIZATIONS22
(in  US$ Million  and percent)
198a  1989  1990  1991  1992  1988-92
Europe  & Central  Asa
-fDlf rom privatizations  33.2  61  6.6  586.6  1,930.0  2,704.8  6,869.2
-as share of total FOI  (%)  2.38  22.06  17.84  36.37  47.87  31.86
Latin  America  & Caribbean
-FDI  from privatizations  213.7  157.3  2,136.3  3,299.9  2,311.8  8,119.0
-as  share of total FDI  (%M  2.67  2.20  27.65  26.85  16.78  16.43
Eet Asia  & Pacific
-FDI  from privatizations  0 0  0.0  0.0  75.0  301.7  376.7
-as  share  of total FDI  (%)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.58  1.95  0.68
South Asia
-FDl from privatizations  0.0  0.1  10.6  4.2  37.0  51.9
-as share  ot total  FDI (%  0.00  0.04  3.64  1.18  8.81  3.39
Sub-Saharan  Africa (a)
-FDI  from privatizations  0.0  13.8  38.1  2.8  44.0  98.5
-as share  of total FOI  (%)  0.00  0.56  5.70  0.15  3.44  1.37
North Africa & Middle East
-FDI  from privotizations  0.0  1.0  0.0  3.2  22.5  26.7
-as share  of total FDI  %%)  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.45  1.09  0.38
TOTAL
-FDl from privatizations  246.9  787.8  2770.6  5314.9  5421.8  14,542.0
-as share  of total FDI (%)  1.25  3.38  11.54  15.67  14.17  10.44
So,rceforPFD data: DMW,  Balanc ofPayments  Yearbook  1992
Note:  Foreign  dired invcsment  data  for 1992  ae World  Bank  and  DM staff  esrimate.
(a)  excludLng  South  Africa
V.  Privatization  Exoeriences  at the Countra Level
For the period 1988-92,  privatization  transactions  were recorded  for a total of 72 nations,
of which 47 were developing  countries. Several countries,  however, only show one or
two transactions, therefore not indicating the existence of an extensive privatization
prograr  aiong those 29 developing  countries  with numerous  privatization  transactions,
the  experiences differ substantially in  terms  of  size, sectoral  focus. and  foreign
participation.
In terms of sales volume,  Mexico  clearly  leads  the developing  world with a total of almost
$21 billion  during 1988-92,  about $5 billion  of which came from foreign  investors. The
three largest sellers,  Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, accounted for 60 percent of total
privatization revenues among developing countries.  With respect  to  numbers of
22  A country  breakdown  on FDI resulting  from privatizations  and its share in total FDI is provided  in the
appendix in Tables A-3 and A-4.
22transactions,  however, the  same three were responsible for only  19 percent of  all
developing  country  privatizations.  This is only  marginally  larger than the 141 transactions
recorded for Hungary alone.  In fact th.  three largest privatizers in Eastern Europe,
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  and Poland,  accounted  for 30 percent of all transactions. The
degree of foreign participation  is quite different among individual  countries, but it is
interesting to  note the  strong participation of foreigners in  privatizations  in Eastern
Europe in terms of sales  volume  as well  as number  of transactions.
Figure 7  THE 15  LARGEST  PRIVATIZERS  IN THE DEVELOPING  WORLD
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In order to get an understanding  of the intensity  of the existing privatization  programs
relative to country size, the ranking according to privatization revenue per capita is m8ore
23revealing. Surprisingly,  Belize  appears  as the most intense  privatizer. Through  the sale of
the country's telecommunications  services since 1988 as well as the its main electricity
generator, the country received almost US$60 million or  about US$300 per person.
Besides Belize, several other smaller countries such as Jamaica, Benin, and Togo also
appear in the ranking. Relative to their size, these countries  privatized  more intensively
than some large countries  such as Brazil  or Poland,  while  their efforts received  practically
no press coverage at all.  It also shows that Sub-Saharan  African countries are quite
capable  of carrying  out extensive  privatization  programs. The second and third place are
occupied by the two main privatizers in Eastern Europe: Hungary with US$238 and
Czechoslovakia  with US$121. Poland,  on the other hand, drops to the 17th  position  with
only about $4 per capita  in privatizations.
Especially  the participation  of foreign  investors  is strongly  dependent  on the host country's
willingness  to open the privatization  program to foreign interests.  Only in exceptional
cases such as Mexico can the government  be selective  writh  respect to  sector-specific
access to the program. While  foreigners  were basically  excluded  from the comprehensive
privatization  of the banking  sector, outsxie investors  were not deterred to participate  in
other sales, providing  a large volume of foreign exchange. In most cases, even limited
restrictions  on foreign  participation  generally  appear  to deter foreign  investors,  resulting  in
only linited international  interest.  A more detailed discussion of  individua.  country
programs  can be found in the Annex.
VI. Do Privatizations Attract Foreign Direct Investors?
While  privatizations contribute directly to  overall foreign direct investment inflows
through the sale of assets to foreign  investors,  they might also have an indirect effect by
attracting additional investors outside of  the  privatization program.  First  of  all,
privatizations  can have  a signaling  effect,  indicating  an increased  openness  of the particular
country regarding  private entrepreneurship  and an increased  willingness  by the authorities
to accept and support private  economic  activity. Thus, foreign  investors  might expect an
improved regulatory environment  that  is less restrictive and therefore conducive to
prospective  investment  projects. Secondly,  investors  might also expect an improvement  in
the  general profitability of  investment projects through the  elimination of  market
distortions  via the transfer of inefficiently  run SOEs to the private sector. This should  be
particularly  relevant in sectors that have a public-goods  character in the sense that they
provide certain ser  ses which are relevant for the profitability  of all other economnic
sectors in the economy. The decision  of a foreign investor to engage in a project in a
developing  country is certainly  dependent  on a wide variety of factors.  However, the
availability  of certain basic goods and services, essential  to the success of any standard
entrepreneurial  venture, will always  be a crucial  determinant. Thus a foreign  investor can
be expected to  be deterred if the  infrastructural  environment  is weak, reducing the
expected profitability  of the venture because of unreliable  energy supply, low-standard
communications  and transportation  media,  or limited  availability  of local financing. The
privatization  of such infrastructural  services  can therefore  have a strong effect, attracting
24additional investment in  the  expectation (or  realization) of  an  improved econornic
environment.
In a recent study,  Edwards [11990]  attempted  to estimate  the deterrminants  of foreign  direct
investment  to developing  countries. Based on the empirical  and theoretical  literature on
FDI, he selected a set of structural  variables,  deemed  to be of relevance  in the decision-
making  process of a foreign  investor.  Tfhese  variables  were used to estimate  the everage
level of FDI relative  to GDP as well as the percentage  share in total FDI to developing
countries  for a cross-section  of 58 developing  countries  during  the period 1971-81. The
central  independent  variables,  Edwards  included  in his regression,  were:
- Income  per capita as a proxy for the (inverse  of the) return on capital  and its coefficient
was expected to be negative. While it seems obvious that foreign  direct investors will
detennine their investments  based on the expected rate of  return, such data are not
generally  available,  especially  in the case of poorer countries. As a proxy, Edwards uses
income per capita, expecting  that countries  with a lower per capita income will tend to
receive  a higher share  of FDI.
- Foreign trade as  a measure of the  country's openness with a  positive coefficient
expected. Given  that most foreign  investment  projects are directed  towards the tradables
sector, the country's degree of openness  with respect to international  trade should be a
relevant  factor in the decision.
- Domestic investment as an indicator for the general investment climate.  Given that
domestic  and foreign  investments  are complements,  the coefficient  should  be positive.
- Government  consumption  as a measure of the size of the government  with a negative
expected  coefficient. The government  size with respect to domestic  economic  activity  is
assumed  to be proxy for the host country's  stance  towards private initiative.
- the real exchange rate as measured by Summers  and Heston as an indicator of the
country's degree of international  competitiveness  with a depreciating  real exchange  rate
reflecting improved  competitiveness. As in the case of the foreign trade variable, the
foreign  investors'  focus on the tradables  sector implies  that exchange  rate movenients  and
the general  economic  competitiveness  of the host country  should  matter for the investment
decision.
- real GDP was included  in the FDI share regression  as a measure of the size of the
economy and potential extent of scale economies;  the coefficient  was expected to  be
positive.
Using these same independent  variables,  the model  was first re-estimated  with only minor
modifications  for a cross-section  of 21 countries 23 for the period 1988-92  using  OLS. The
selection  of countries  was based on the existence  of sizable  privatization  programs during
the period as well as data availability. 24 Following  Edwards, the FDI determinants  were
23  These countries  are Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil, Chile,  Colombia,  Costa Rica,  Honduras,  Jamaica,
Kenya,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Peru, the Philippines,  Poland, Portugal,  Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Turkey,  and Venezuela.
24 Seven  countries had to be elimninated  for data icasons: Benin, China, Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  India,
Panama,  and Togo.
25estimated  for the level of FDI (FDI per capita)25  as we!l  as for the share of FDI in FDI to
all developing  countries. 26 Except for the variable  real GNP in the FDI share regressions,
all variables are calculated as treans for the observations 1988-92 and weighted by
population. The estimated  equations  have  the following  forn:
FDI,  GDP~  EX7M,  1NV  CON
(1)  'I'  + A  '  +X  '  +  '  +  ' +FXR  +e
(2)  n  a+1p  3X+  +x  ++  M+pX,  +  -,GDP,  "' +  e
fjDI  APO,  P,  POP,  POP,
i=,
where EXIM represents the sum of exports and imports, INV stands for gross fixed
domestic capital formation,  CON is government  consumption,  EXR is the real effective
exchange  rate, and the denominator  POP stands for population. The subscript  i indicates
the ith country.
The re-estimation  generates  results very similar  to Edwards'  study as shown  in Table  4.
Table  4  Re-estimating  the Edwards  Model
Dependent  FDI  pr  cap4ita  FDI  shae
Variable
Constant  -7.372  1.3171
(-0.859)  11.0372)
GDP  per  capita  0.0043  -0.0005
(0.8865)  (-0.5908)
Trade  0.0229 * *  0.0011
(2.7279)  (-0.8538)
Inves.  nent  0.0491  0.0217
(1.0815)  (3.2524)
Government  -0.04  -0.02
Consumption  (-0.954)  (-3,21641
Exchange  Rate  -0.06e  40.0174
(-0.722)  (-1.2893)
Real  GO)P  -I-  2.1  2E-05
I  1  1~~~~~3,3334)
Adi. A-Squared  0.8908  0.6728
t-statistics  in parenthes"s
"I  indicates  statistical  significance  at the  98%-level.
The trade variable  is positive  and statistically  significant  in the FDI per capita estimation,
indicating  that economic  openness  is an important  aspect of the decision  to invest abroad.
25 Edwards  weights  FDI  by GDP  rather  than  by  population,  but  the results  obtained  here  are  quite  similar
to results  when  GDP  is used  as weight.  Using  population  generally  resulted  in a better  fit, possibly  related
to measurement  difficulties  in GDP,  especially  when  calculated  in dollar  terms.
26 'Nhile Edwards  calculates  the FDI share based  on OECD  data, IMF  data on FDI were  used here.
26In the share regressions,  however, the variable  was not significant. Investment 27, on the
other hand, appears to  be more relevant in the allocation of FDI among developing
countries,  being positive  and statistically  significant  in the FDI share  estimation,  but not in
the FDI per capita one.  The same holds true for government  consumption 28, which is as
expected negative  and significant,  but only in the share regression. Thus, a reduction of
the economic  size of the government  attracts foreign  investors,  probably due to reduced
intervention and market distortions.  Differing from Edwards, the  per capita income
variable, which was statistically  not  significant  but consistently  negative in Edwards'
analysis,  does gea,erally  not show the expected sign.  This indicates  that GDP per capita
might not be a good proxy for profitability,  as Edwards himself  suggests. In fact, as he
himself  points out, investors will also be attracted by larger markets, allowing  them to
internalize  prorits from sales within the country, rather than producing at low cost for
exports only.  Consequently,  the coefficient  on GDP per capita turns  out insignificant
simply  because it picks up both effects simultaneously.  The results on the international
competitiveness  variable  were consistently  positive and significant  in the Edwards study.
Here, however,  the variable  is insignificant,  while  of the correct sign. 29 The reason for this
is most likely  data related.  Edwards used the Summers  and Heston real exchange rate
index, which  is, however,  not available  from 1988 onwards. Therefore,  the real effective
exchange  rate as calculated  by the IMIF  was used as a substitute.
The general fit of both regressions  was quite good with an adjusted  R2 of 0.89 in the per
capita estimation  and 0.67 in the share regression. Both estimations  also show a better
overall fit compared to Edwards estimations. 30 This might partially  be explained  by the
use of population  as the variable  weight  rather than GDP which all too often is distorted
through exchange  rate fluctuations.
These results do,  however, not yet  take into account the  existence of' privatization
programs. In order to estimate  the effect  of privatizations  on the foreign  direct investment
decision, two  variables were  added to  the  model.  Privatization  revenues per  capita
indicate the  relative size of  the  existing privatization program  in  each  country.
Furthermore,  the foreign exchange  ratio, defined  as foreign  exchange  from privatizations
as percentage share of total privatization revenues, was added as a  measure of the
country's openness with respect to  foreign investors. Both coefficients  are, of course,
expected to be positive. Note that the dependent  variable changes  in both regressions:
Given that the goal is to  estimate secondary, indirect effects on FDI resulting from
privatizations,  FDI per capita as well as FDI share were recalculated  by subtracting  FDI
resulting  from privatizations  from total FDI flows  for each country. Thus, the estimated
equations  are modified  as follows:
27 Defined  as  gross  fixed  domestic  capital  formation  in the  IMF  National  Accounts.
28 Derived  from the IMF  National Accounts.
29 The Summers  and Heston  measure  of the real exchange  rate is defined  as local currency  per USS,  while
the IME measure  is defined  in the reverse. Thus, the sign on the coefficient  is expected  to be negative.
30Edwards  reports  the unadjusted  R2only with 0.592  for the regression  on the FDI level  and 0.618 on the
share regression. The comparative  values  for the estimations  here were 0.918  and 0.771 respectively.
27(I)  (.FDI -AFD1, )  GDP  E-XIM+  INV,  CON,  M  E  PIV  Xi  +  hcEX (la)  1  pp  )a+p  ODp+X  p  pO+  pp+XR+lI  p  +FR7ZX+
(2) (EDI, - PEDI,)  GDP,  EXYIM,  INVI  CONI  ,  PRIv  EX (2a)  (  lx)  +p~o  i +X  - pp  +6p  +0POp  + 9MY, + GDP,*d+  ApRt  +  vp!I  +e
X(FDI -PFDI)  POP  POP  POP  POP,  POP,  PRIV,
with PFDI representing FDI  resulting from privatization sales, PRIV  standing for  total
privatization  revenues,  and  FEX  being  the  foreign  exchange  obtained  through
privatizations (in the form of FDI as well as portfolio equity investments).
The  estimation  of  these  equations  indicates that  privatizations  are  a  very  important
element in the foreign direct investment decision (see Table 5).  On both  variables, the
coefficients are positive and, compared to  the  other regressors, quite large in  both
regressions. While  they are only moderately  significant  in the share estimation,  they show
a high statistical  significance  in the per capita regression. Both variables  also prove to be
very robust, barely  changing  size or statistical  significance  in different  specifications  of the
model.  While such interpretations  always have to  be taken with a grain of salt, the
coefficients  indicate that each dollar it, privatization  revenue generates an additional  38
cents in new FDI, and that a one percentage  increase  in foreign  participation  adds another
50 cents.  Note also that the regression  fit improves  drastically  in both cases, with the
adjusted  R2 jumping  to 0.97 in the per capita case  and to 0.77 in the share estimation.
Table  5 Privatizations  as a Determinant  of FDI
Dependent  FDI pr  aepita  FDI stcr
Vetiab.
Constant  -6.481  1.4084
(11,525)  1.406)
GDP per capita  -7.73E-05  -0.002
1-0.025)  1 1.8818)
Trade  0.0283  -040005
(8.7059)  (-0.4598)
Investment  0.0023  0.01f1
(0.0907)  (2.9511)
Goveonment  0.013  -0.0128
Consumption  (-0.5el)  i-2.2473)
Exchange  Rate  0.1238  0.0002
(2.5407)  (0.014)
Roa GDP  R  2.38E-05
(4.1269)
Foreign Exchango  0.497  0.0258
Ratio  (7.125)  (1.4107)
Privatization  0.3804  0.0854
Revenue  (2.7324i  01.889)
Adj.  R-Squared  0.9724  0.7878
t-statistioc  in  parenthaeee;
indicates statistical  significance at the 98%-levol,
indicate  statistical significance at the 95  %-level,
indicates statistical  significanos at the 90%-levol.
28Are these effects  on PDI  independent  of the type of privatization  carried  out, or are there
differences  with respect to  the particular economic sector in which the government
privatizes?  In case privatizations  are perceived by foreign investors only as a signal
indicating  a general improvement  in the investment  climate  through reduced governmnent
intervention  and restrictive  regulations,  only the relative size of the privatization  program
should  matter. If, on the other hand,  investors  also expect an improved  future profitability
resulting  from the privatization  of particular  entities  that provide  goods and services  to the
whole  economy  such as telecommunications,  power generation,  transportation  or financial
services,  privatizations  in individual  sectors should  have a different  weight  in the decision-
making  process.
In  order to  test  these  hypotheses, the  general privatization revenues variable was
substituted  by sector-specific  variables  on privatization  revenues,  resulting  in .he following
regression  equations:
(lb)  aD-FDP)  GDPO  +zEXpi,  + 6ppv  CON'  '  '  - £
(FDI, - PFDI 0)  GDP~  EXIM 3 JKV  CON  ,  PR1V,  FEX,
(2b)  (a,  + p  a+X  +  p  +X  p  +  a  + Cp* N, +  EX,  + -GDP,-' +y j  u +  v  +  e
(FD - FD)  PP,  POP,  POP,  POP,  POP,  PRWIV
'.3
where the subscripts  ij indicate  the jth sector of country i.  The individual  sectors tested
were the primary sector, industry, financial  services, infrastructure and others, which
predomi.iantly  consists  of services.
The results of the estimation  are repozted  in Table  6.  For both the estimation  on FDI per
capita as well as FDI share, the coefficient  on privatizations  in the secondary sector
(consisting  of manufacturing,  chemicals  and heavy  industry)  as well  as other privatizations
(services)  W?3  not statistically  significant,  and in two cases it even had the wrong sign.
Privatizations  in the financial  sector (insurance  and banking) as well as in infrastructure
(power, telecommunications,  transportation,  and water), on the other hand, showed a
positive coefficient  and were statistically  significant  in most cases.  This implies that
privatization  of "public  goods"-type  SOEs  has a strong  effect  on investor  perception  of the
country  and attracts additional  FDI inflows. Privatizations  in the other sectors usually  do
not have  that effect. The only exception  to this is the case of privatizations  in the primary
sector (agribusiness,  hydrocarbons,  and mining). While  having  no effect in the FDI share
estimation,  the variable  primary sector privatizations  showed  a very large coefficient  with
a  statistical significance  at the  98  percent level.  This initially unexpected result is
explained by the  substantial privatizations in  the  hydrocarbons sector, especially in
Argentina  and also in Brazil.  The partial sei%off  of state-owned oil companies  plays a
unique  role in the privatization  program of many  developing  countries. Having been the
showcase for national self-sufficiency  and self-determination  for a  long time in Latin
American  countries especially,  most governments  are hesitant  to put their oil companies
up for sale.  While major oil producers such as Mexico and Venezuela did not yet
seriously contemplate  major privatizations  in this sector, Argentina, in particular, sold
numerous oil fields as well as gas distribution  entities, and finally sold part of its oil
29company  YPF during  the first half  of 1993. For foreign  investors,  this move might  have
indicated  a major  change  in attitude  towards  private  sector involvement,  thus attracting
substantial  amounts  of additional  FDI.
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In summary, the existence of a  sizable privatization  program that is relatively freely
accessible  to foreigners  can be an important  vehicle  in attracting additional  FDI inflows.
In particular,  privatizations  that have  the potential  of improving  the economic  environment
for  investment projects by  elimrinating  existing bottlenecks in  the  availability of
infrastructural  services as well as local financing  are important motivations  for foreign
investors to set up ventures in a developing  country.  In particular, in countries where
infrastructural  bottlenecks  are a frequent  complaint  by foreign  investors,  such as Indonesia
or the Philippines  whose difficulties  in providing  a reliable  energy  and water supply  made
headlines in  the international  press, intensive privatization in these sectors might be
capable  of generating  substantial  amounts  of additional  FDI.
30VIT.  Conclusion
After  a disappointing  performance  of the vast majority  of their SOEs,  developing  countries
increasingly  realize  the need  to restructure  their economies,  reducing  the size of the public
sector. During the last decade, many  countries  also were pressed to undertake  measures
to reduce their budget deficits,  being caught in the debt crisis and the correspondingly
severe foreign exchange constraints.  Highly inefficient SOEs proved incapable of
financing  themselves,  continuously  requiring  capital injections  either through loans from
private capital  markets or directly  out of the government  budget. Thus, they contributed
significantly  to the ballooning  external debt of many developing  countries, forcing the
governments  to take over a substantial  share of this publicly  guaranteed  debt in the wake
of the crisis,  while  the need for transfers  and subsidies  remained.
In order to alleviate the already strained budget, many developing  countries embarked
upon extensive privatization  programs by transferring  state-owned assets into private
hands. After a rather slow start due to political  opposition  by vested interests within the
countries,  privatizations  expanded  rapidly  during  the last five years. The auctioning  off of
a large number of SOEs generated substantial  revenues for some developing countries
and, in addition, significantly  reduced pressures on the public budget, not being forced
anymore  to finance loss-making  enterprises. Equally  important,  however, privatizations
supported the  renewed access to  international capital markets for many developing
nations.  Foreign participation  in  privatizations  was generally very strong, providing
significant  amounts of foreign  exchange  in the process  through portfolio  as well as direct
investments. Furthermore,  privatizations  attracted additional  investments  by improving
the profitability  of the economic  environment. An improved  infrastructure  combined  with
liberalized financial markets in  developing countries reduces  overhead  costs  for
entrepreneurs  and facilitates  the successful  management  of any private venture. Overall,
the benefits from a comprehensive,  large-scale privatization  program can be manifold,
generating government revenues and needed foreign exchange, reducing government
expenditures  through the elimination  of costly SOEs, providing  incentives  for domestic  as
well as  foreign investors, and especially improve the  competitiveness  of  developing
country  economies  in the global  markets.
Privatizations  can be expected  to continue  strongly  in the upcoming  years. Countries  that
are  already engaged in  successful privatization  programs such as  Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela,  are determined  to  continue their efforts by opening the
program  to other sectors which  have  as of yet been  excluded. In addition,  a large number
of countries,  which have not yet been successful  in launching  such a program, stress the
importance  of privatizations  and plan to sell large numbers  of SOEs in the near future.
Just recently,  Zambia  announced  a program  to sell more  than 150  companies  over the next
five years, while Uganda  passed legislation  for a privatization  program, supported by a
loan from the World Bank.  Morocco announced  that it expects to generate $1.3 billion
through the sale of 112 companies,  and Bangiadesh  is determined  to sell its loss-making
power sector to foreign investors.  The governments of Guyana and Romania plan to start
an extensive privatization program during 1993, while China is apparently committed to
31restructure the country's bloated state sector and to transform  its economy into a more
market-oriented  system.  The largest push in terms of privatizations  can, however, be
expected  to come from  Russia, where  the privatization  program  has already started, but is
caught  in political  controversies. In general,  the prospects for privatizations  in developing
countries  appear to be strong and a continued  growth in number  of transactions  and sales
volume  is to be expected  in the upcoming  years.
32ANNEX:  COUNTRY  NOTES
A Latin America  and the Caribbean
Argentina
The Argentine  privatization  program  took off rapidly  after the election  of President  Carlos
Menem.  Argentina's  public sector was particu!arly  bloated and unprofitable,  showing a
loss of about $4 billion  in 1989.31 In order to limit  budgetary pressures  and reduce the
country's extemal debt,  President Menem pushed the  State  Reform Law  through
Congress,  allowing  the executive  branch  to totally or partially  privatize  SOEs. In order to
reduce the foreign exchange control, Argentina  was particularly  keen to attract foreign
investors, making its privatization  program one of the most open ones with respect to
foreign  participation. From a total privatization  revenue of $10.7 billion,  $4.4 billion  or
about 41 percent came  from foreign  sources. Furthermore,  in its attempt to alleviate  the
government's  external  debt burden,  Argentina  was the only country  to make extensive  use
of debt-equity  swaps. Between 1988  and end-1992,  a total of about $13 billion  in external
debt obligations  were elirninated  that way.32
While  most countries  begin  their privatization  efforts with rather minor assets, leaving  the
large ones  for the end, Argentine's  program  started  with a big bang in 1990. 60 percent of
ENTEL, the nation's  telephone  company,  which  in 1989 accounted  for about one third of
the country's total SOE deficit, 33 was sold off to  predominantly  foreign interests for
approximately $1.3  billion, involving a  debt-equity swap of  $5  billion face value,
representing the  largest  swap  in  any  privatization ever.  This  privatization in
telecommunications  was continued  with the sale of 30 percent in Telef6nica  de Argentina
(the newly  privatized  company  for the southern  region)  in 1991  for $830 million,  involving
a $364 million GDR issue, and in  1992, when the remaining  30 percent of Telecom
Argentina  (the newly  privatized  company  of the northern  region)  were sold off in a public
offer for $1.2 billion.
Another unique feature of the Argentine privatization  program was the conscientious
effort to auction off parts of the petroleum  and gas industry. During 1990-92,  privatized
were almost 100 drilling  areas, 10 gas distributors,  and various refineries,  amounting  to a
total revenue  of around $3.7 billion. This  was topped with the sell-off  of a 45 stake in the
state-owned  oil company  YPF (Yacimientos  Petroliferos  Fiscales)  through  an international
public  offer,  valued  at about $3 billion  in June of 1993. By September  1, 1993,  another 13
percent of YPF shares  will  have  been placed  with private  investors.
During 1992, the  Argentine government also put  great emphasis on  improving the
country's  transportation  facilities  with concessions  sold for major railroads  as well as port
31 Cluttctrbuck  (1991),  p.59.
32 Figures  for debt-equity  swaps  in 1992  were only  available  in form of the cash equivalent  (i.e., the
discounted  value), requiring  the estimation  of the face value  by assuming  a swap  price of 50c/S.
33Clutterbuck  (1991),  p.59.
33facilities  such  as grain elevators. Also starting  in 1992, privatizations  in the energy  sector
began to take off through the sale of 10 power utilities  for another $1.4 billion. in June
1993, a consortium  including  three electric  utilities  from the U.K. and the U.S. won a 95-
year concession  to own and operate Argentina's  high voltage  transmission  system  for $230
million.
Brazil
During the military  regime,  Brazil established  a large number of SOEs, reaching  700 in
1985.34 In March 1990, President  Fernando Collor announced  a sweeping privatization
program, to be headed by the Social  and Economic  Development  Bank (BNDES),  and in
August,  57  companies were  earmarked for  privatization despite  strong  political
opposition.  In  1991, the first five companies were sold off, among them the  steel
producer Usiminas,  which with $1.5 billion  at present represents  the largest privatization
transaction  in Brazil. During the early  part of 1992, the privatization  program picked up
pace and another 13 companies  were auctioned  off, with the largest  transactions  occurring
in the steel  and petroleum  sector.
With the ouster of President  Collor in late 1992, the program  began to stall and not until
recently  has his successor President  Itamar Franco decided to revive the proaram.  In
total,  a  revenue of  $4.3  billion has  been generated during  1988-92, but  foreign
participation  was, at best, marginal. Currently,  Brazil is not a very attractive  option for
international  investors,  given the general political  and economic  uncertainty,  reflected  in a
high rate of inflation. This is exacerbated  by the fact that the country still has not been
able  to conclude  a Brady deal as well  as the legal restriction  that foreigners  cannot acquire
a share larger than 40 percent through privatizations,  except  through direct congressional
authorization.
However, the privatization  program might gain speed again with the announcement  by
President  Franco to intensify  privatization  efforts. In early 1993, two major trarsactions
have been concluded,  involving  the sale of 31.5 percent of Poliolefinas,  a petrochemical
company,  for $86.1 million,  as well as the country's largest steel producer, CSN, which
was auctioned  off for $1.06 billion.
Chile
Chile certainly has the richest history in terms of privatization  compared to all other
developing  countries, having  privatized  around 400 enterprises since 1973 for a total of
about  $2.5  billion.  After Patricio Aylwin replaced General Pinochet as  the  first
democratically  elected  president  in March of 1990, however,  the privatization  process has
been reduced significantly. Only six transactions were completed since then, with the
largest ones in  mining and energy.  Besides the  still state-owned copper producer
CODELCO  as well as CORFO,  a major financial  institution,  most of the state-held  assets
34  Privatization  International,  Yearbook  1991,  p.138.
34are sold. Thus, Chile  should  not be expected  to have any major privatization  spurts in the
near future, but the next government  in early 1994 might initiate a new privatization
program.
Honduras
In Central  America,  only Honduras  appears  to have a privatization  program of substantial
size.  The program was started in August of  1986 as response to  the disappointing
performance  of SOEs which were created primarily  during the mid-1970s. During the
period 1988-92,  a total of 29 companies  was privatized  for $61.5 million  in revenues. 35
A debt-equity  swap program is in place for privatization  purposes,  and, based on official
government  sources, the external debt has been reduced by about $30 million since the
inception  of the program.  While the Callejas  administration  is a strong proponent of
privatization,  no major transactions  in infrastructural  sectors have been undertaken  as of
yet, but some  are scheduled  for 1993. The program  is generally  open to foreign  investors,
but the interest  has not been particularly  strong; only  five transactions  involving  foreigners
have  been  recorded,  having  generated  $13 million  in foreign  exchange.
.'eru
Over  the past two decades,  government  intervention  in the economy  steadily  increased,
and in the last few years,  the state's 130  companies  ran losses of an accumulated  annual  $2
billion. 36 In late 1991, the Fujimori  Government  established  the legaVlorganizational
framework  for a broad privatization  program. It is the Government's  objective  to privatize
all state holdings  by mid-1995. The program commenced  in 1992 with the sale of 10
holdings for US$207 million, including Hierro Peru which was sold to  the  Chinese
Shougang Corporation for $120 million  with an additional $140 million  in investment
ccwimitments.  In January of 1993, the government  continued  its privatization  efforts by
selling  70 percent of its national  airline  Aeroperu  to Aeromexico  for $54 million.
In 1993-94,  the Government  expects  to sell its major  holdings  in mining  (Minero  Perui  and
Centromin), petroleum (Petroperui  and its subsidiaries),  telecommunications,  electricity,
banking  and manufacturing.  It also expects  to grant a concession  to a private investor  for
operation  of the Lima  water supply. Proceeds  are expected  to be US$1.2  billion  annually.
Mexico
Mexico  began its privatization  program  in 1983  under  President  Miguel  de la Madrid,  who
disincorporated  about 600 small SOEs until mid-1988. Most of these companies  were,
however, liquidated and only about 150 were actually sold for about $500 million. 37
Under  President  Salinas,  who came  to office  in December  1988,  the process of privatizing
35 Four  additional  privatizations  were  only  small-scale  with  marginal  asset  value  and were  therefore  not
included  in the data set.
36 LatinFinance  Supplement  (March  1993),  p.95.
37 Clutterbuck (1991), p.64 .
35large SOEs accelerated  rapidly,  and the number  of SOEs was reduced to 227 as of end-
1992, compared  to  1,155 in 1982.38 Durini this second  phase, a total revenue of $20.8
billion  was generated,  includinj $4.9 billion  in foreign  capital  investments.
!988 already  saw some major privatizations  with the sale of Mexicana  de Cobre for $1.4
billion  and the country's  largest airline  Aerovias  de Mexico  for $340 million. But large-
scale  privatizations  really  became  effective  starting  in 1990,  when the government  sold the
first part of its national  telephone  company  TELMEX  to domestic and foreign investors
for almost $1.8 billion.  The remaining  15 percent in share capital of TELMEX were
auctioned  off the following  year through  an ADR issue of $2.4 billion,  plus an additional
$500 million  for 5 percent in Telefonos  de Mexico  which  went to Southwestern  Bell.
In 1991, Mexico started a massive  privatization  of its banking sector, which was largely
nationalized  in 1982  in response  to the debt crisis. By end-1992,  18 banks were sold for a
total $12 billion  with Banamex  for $3.2 billion  and Bancomer  for $2.5 billion  as the largest
two.  But while restrictions  governing foreign investment  in financial  institutions  were
relaxed, foreign investments  were still limited to  minority, non-voting share holdings,
resulting  in practically  no foreign  participation  at all in the banking  privatization. The only
foreign exchange generated was through a  $638 million GDR issue in the  case of
Bancomer.  Such restrictions on  foreign investment held the  share of FDI  through
privatizations to  only 5 percent, which is very small compared to  other  privatizing
countries.
Despite the substantial  size of its privatization  program, Mexico does not engage in a
careless sell-off  of state assets, as the case of the banking industry indicates.  Several
sectors such as postal services, electricity,  and, in particular, the oil industry are by
constitutional  law part of the public  sector, and no major initiatives  have been undertaken
to change this.  But still, the government  plans to repeat its privatization  success of the
two previous  years during 1993  by selling  SOEs  worth about $5 billion. While  no major
transactions  have, as of yet, occurred  during 1993, the sale of a 70 percent stake in the
state insurance  group Asemex  as well as the privatization  of major TV networks  are under
preparation.
Venezuela
Under the presidency of Carlos Andres Perez during 1974-79, state intervention  grew
rapidly  with the nationalization  of the oil, gas, and iron industry  as well  as the creation  of a
number  of "strategic"  enterprises. When  Perez came back to office in February  of 1989,
the country owned 62 companies  in a wide range of industries. 39 Starting in 1990, the
privatization  of SOEs  began and by end-1992,  16 companies  were sold for a total of $2.4
billion.
38 Barnes  (1992), p.6.
39 Barnes (1992), p.  158
36percent by a consortium  including  GTE, AT&T, and Telefonica  6e Espalia.  While the
privatization  program is open to foreigners,  their participation  during 1990-92 of around
68 percent of total revenue  is mainly  reflected  by the overwhelming  weight  of the CANTV
deal. For 1993,  another 45 companies  are scheduled  for privatization 40.
B  Europe  and Central  Asia
Czechoslovakia 41
Until 1989, 98 percent of all Czechoslovakian  assets, were in state hands, consisting  of
about 7,000 medium- and large-scale '!iterprises as well as 25,000-30,000 small-scale
enterprises. In the process of transforming  itself  to a market-based  economy,  the country
is engaged in one of the most radical privatization  programs ever.  During 1992, mass
privatization  of a vast number of small-scale  enterprises through the voucher scheme
yielded  a revenue of about $1.6 billion. These funds were, however,  used to finance the
extensive  voucher scheme,  thus being  budget  neutral.
For the privatization  of medium-  and large-scale  companies,  a bidding  process was used,
starting in 1991, with a focus on foreign investors given the limited capital availability
domestically.  In 1991, the first 14 entities  were sold, and another 41 in 1992 for a total
revenue of about $1.9 billion.  A wide variety of companies, predominantly  in the
manufacturing  sector, were bought,  usually  by foreign  investors. The largest  transactions
occurred in car manufacturing  with Volkswagen  buying the Skoda Auto Works plant in
1991  for $275 million  plus a total investment  commitment  of $5.3 billion  over the next ten
years, and Renault's  purchase  of Karosa for $222 million  in 1992. In general,  the foreign
participation  in the privatization  of medium-  and large-scale  firms  was unusually  strong
with almost  all of the revenue  stemming  from foreign  sources.
The prospects of the privatization  program in the Czech Republic,  which in the last two
years was substantially  stronger  than the one in the Slovak Republic,  appear to be quite
strong if foreign  interest can be maintained. During 1993, the country therefore  plans to
tackle the problem of a low-standard  infrastructure,  starting with a planned sale of up to
25  percent of  the  national telecommunications  company SPT  Telecom to  foreign
investors.  A second wave of mass privatization  was started in May  1993 with the
distribution  of shares  for 987 state en. rprises.
Hungary
Of  all  Eastern European economies, Hungary has the  longest and  most extensive
experience  with privatizations. Prior to  1989, when the first privatizations  were carried
out, the state held 1,880 SOEs. 42 Since then, over 140 companies  have been privatized
40 LatinFinance  Supplement  (March 1993),  p. 107.
41 "Czechoslovakia"  refers to the Federation  between  the Czech  and the Slovak  Rcpublic  prior to Januarv
1, 1993.
42  International  Financing  L2w Review,  Special  Supplement,  (September  1992),  p.24.
37for a total revenue of close to $2.5 billion  in by far the largest number  of transactions  in
any country.  Despite strong political  opposition,  especially  during 1989 and 1990, the
program continued  to run strong  over the last two years, with annual  revenues  averaging
about $800 million. The progran, is also far more market-oriented  compared to other
privatization  schemes  in Eastern European countries, clearly  avoiding  any voucher mass
privatizations  and focusing  on revenue  generation. While  Hungarians  and foreigners  have
in principle equal access to privatization  transactions,  domestic investors often lack the
capital,  resulting  in a high degree of foreign  participation. Until end of 1992, about $2.3
billion  in foreign  exchange  was paid in privatizations,  accounting  for over 90 percent of
total revenues.
Transactions  were generally  medium-sized  by global standards,  not going beyond $150
million.  The  largest deals occurred relatively early in  the  process  such  as  the
manufacturing  company  Raba which  was bought by General  Motors for $150 million,  or
Tungsram,  which  went to General  Electric  for $110 million. One of the concems is that
most valuable  assets in the manufacturing  sector are already sold, leaving  the state with a
relatively large number of less desirable assets.  On the other hand, the government
declared 1993  the year of the big projects and is pressing  hard to extend  the prDgram  to
banking,  telecommunications  and other public  services  which  have as of yet been excluded
from privatization.  The privatization  of the state banking sector is currently under
preparation,  but no major sale  is expected  before  the end of 1993.
Poland
The Polish  government  the Law on Privatization  of State Enterprises  in August of 1990,
and has since privatized  67 medium-  and large-scale  enterprises  for a total of about $714
in revenues. Compared to the former Czechoslovakia  and Hungaiy, this is quite small,
primarily  due to the general  political  uncertainty  surrounding  the legal status and property
rights of individual  firms to  be privatized. The largest transactions are actually joint
ventures  with future investment  commitments,  representing  defacto privatizations,  as was
the case with Fiat who went into a joint venture project with the car manufacturer  FSM
with a  future investment commitment  of  $830 rnillion over  5 years.  According to
information  from the Polish government,  however, most of these commitmelits  have not
yet been realized.
1992 clearly  was the strongest  year of privatizations,  but the political  difficulties  continue
to haunt the state privatization  zgency. In April  of 1993,  the government  finally  managed
to  push the  intended mass privatization scheme through parliament after  drawn-out
political  debates. The plan  is on a voucher  basis involving  600 SOEs. During this year, a
privatization  of parts of the oil industry  as well as nine state-owned  banks is planned  with
financial  support from the World  Bank  and EBRD. In addition,  a privatization  of the state
banking sector is intended and in April of 1993, the sale of WBK bank to foreign and
domestic investors represented the first major bank privatization  in all of Central and
Eastern Europe.
38Portugal
With the 1974  revolution  came  along  substantial  nationalizations,  especially  in the financial
sector.  Starting in  1987, the  Social Democrat governrent  began to  re-privatize a
substantial  number  of these SOEs. During 1989-92,  20 entities  worth $3.7 billion  were
privatized  with a focus on the financial  sector which  contributed  about 77 percent to total
revenue. While  the degree  of foreign  participation  could not be clearly  determined  due to
dat'4  limitations,  the restrictions  on foreign  investment  are quite stringent. Foreigners  are
only allowed  to buy a limited  number  of shares.
Russia
The privatization  effort in Russia  was progressing  only slowly  compared  to other Eastern
European  countries,  generally  stifled  by political  uncertainty.  During 1992  and early 1993,
however, the privatization  program picked up rapidly.  By mid-1993, about 50-60,000
small entities  had been privatized,  representing  about 30 percent of all small-scale  SOEs.
By March  1993, the  distribution of vouchers worth 10,000 roubles per person was
completed  throughout Russia and some 220 auctions had been held.  In addition,  about
2,500 large SOEs, approximately  50 percent of the total, had been transformed  into joint-
stock companies, and approximately 600  of  them  are  essentially privatized. 43 In
particular,  during 1993  three major companies  were partially  privatized,  consisting  of the
two car manufacturers  Zil and AvtoVaz  as well  as the machinery  manufacturer  Uralmash.
Turkey
The Turkish privatization  program started in 1984 with the privatization  of two large
projects,  the Bosporus Bridge  and the Keban  Hydroelectric  Dam. In the following  years,
the process slowed significantly  due to  strong political resistance.  In  recent years,
privatizations  activities  became  more active, while  mostly  in the sale of minority  holdings
only,  resultih.g  in the privatization  of 59 companies  during 1988-92  for $1.1 billion. While
privatizations  are carried out in a variety of sectors,  the cement industry  was particularly
important  in recent years with 18 firms  being sold. Local investors  dominate,  but foreign
participation  is reasonably  strong,  having  generated  almost  $400 million  or about one third
of total revenue.  But  despite the apparently impressive  number of  transactions,  the
Turkish privatization  program is progressing  only slowly and as of yet only a minor
portion of the whole state sector has been privatized. The new Prime Minister Tansu
Ciller  is currently  formulating  a program  to speed up privatization  in order to reduce the
public  deficit  and to raise  economic  efficiency.
C East Asia and Pacific
Malaysia
While the  Malaysian economy is  known for  its  inherently private  structure,  the
government  still owns about 900 SOEs. 44 A privatization  program was started in 1985,
43 For more  detail see Im, Jalali, and Saghir (June 1993).
44 Clutterbuck  (1991),  p.72.
39but has not progressed very far since then.  During 1990-92, 12 sizable companies  were
sold for a total $3.9 billion  in revenue. The focus has been on infrastructural  projects in
energy, telecommunications,  and transport.  The largest projects were the sale of the
Tenaga Nasional  Berhad power plant for $1.2 billion  and the National Airline  for $689
million, both privatized in  1992.  Two telecommunications  companies (Syarikat and
Telekom) were also sold since 1990, generating  a  combined  $1.1 billion.  Again, the
participation  by foreign  investors  was difficult  to determine  because of data constraints.
Butt while the  importance of  foreign investment is  generally recognized, foreign
participation  is .estricted to 25 percent and any acquisition  exceeding  M$5 million  also
requires  a cumbersome  approval  process  by the Foreign  Investment  Committee. 45
Philippines
Under  President  Marcos,  the public  sector expanded  rapidly  frem 71 SOEs  in 1972  to 301
in  1986, absorbing almost a quarter of the  public budget. 46 With the  ad,lition of
transferred  assets of government  financial  institutions,  government-owned  entities  swelled
to 700 companies  in 1987. The Aquino Administration's  privatization  program intended
to rationalize  this large and diverse group of government assets, through sales to  the
private sector and through abolishing, consolidating,  and merging with  existing line
agencies. The program  has been quite successful  in accomplishing  the sale of transferred
assets: by end-1992,  293 out of 399 transferred assets had been sold, yielding  almost
US$1.5 billion with foreign participation  providing slightly over one quarter of total
revenues. Steady progress is also being made on the privatization  program's  targets on
public  enterprises. As of mid-1993,  96 government  corporations,  representing  70 percent
of government-owned  assets, have been offered for sale.  Of these, 78 had resulted in
actual sales  yielding  another  US$1  billion.
China
In line with a rapidly  expanding  economy  and growing inflows  of foreign investment,  the
Chinese  government  began a process of incorporating  major enterprises. While  the word
"privatization"  is not officially  used, shares  of a small number  of companies  were offered
in the stock markets of Shanghai  and Shenzhen. Foreigners  participated  in this process
through the purchase of non-voting  "B"-shares  in 12 companies  since 1992. Given that
China is expected to be the next growth pole in East Asia, foreign interest is strong and
likely  to increase  rapidly. In June 1993, for example,  the U.S. beer producer Anheuser-
Busch  bought a 5 percent share  in the well-known  Tsingtao  Brewery  for $115 million.
D  South Asia
Sri Lanka
Among  South Asian countries,  the nation  with the strongest  privatization  efforts in recent
years is Sfi Lanka. Starting in the 1950s, and accelerating  in the 1970s, SOEs increased
45 International  Financing  Law  Review,  Special Supplement  (September  1992),  p.34.
46 Forbes  (1993),  p.1.
40rapidly  in terms of size as well  as numbers,  reaching  160  in the late 1980s  with a control  of
about 40 percent of manufacturing  output, 66 percent in tea production, 33 pcrcent in
rubber production, and 10 percent in coconut production. 47 In  1987, legislatioi' was
passed allowing the conversion of SOEs into limited liability  companies, setting the
framework  for the pri-atization  program.
Starting  in 1989, 16 companies  have been privatized  for at least $125 million,  a sum that
appears small  but is quite .ubstantial  given the size of the country.  Several textile mills,
manufacturing  enterprises,  and hotels were sold, in some cases also to foreign investors,
who paid  a total of almost  $24 mnillion.
Pakistan
Privatizations  took off slowly  in Pakistan, when the national  airline was sold through a
public  share issue  for $11 million  in 1990. 1991  saw the privatization  of two major banks
for about $48 million. A virtual explosion  in privatization  transactions  occurred  in 1992.
49 companies  were sold during the year for a total of $163 million. Most of these SOEs
were rice mills  and bread factories  with only small asset values. But small major cement
plants were also privatized with the largest transaction of the year being Gharibwal
Cement for $44 million. Foreign  participation  in the privatization  program is, however,
only marginal.  During 1990-92, only about $15 million  was generated by attracting
foreign  investors,  amounting  to only  6 percent of total privatization  revenue.
E  Sub-Saharan  Africa
Benin
Following  a rapid expansion  of government  intervention  in the late 1970s, Benin had by
1985 investments in 57 public enterprises, accounting for 75 percent of the nation's
industrial production.  Facing the rapid decline of the profitability  of  its SOEs, the
government  opened  all non-vital  sectors to domestic  and foreign  private  interests. During
the period 1988-92,  8 major SOEs were sold for a total of $53 million  with an unusually
strong foreign  participation,  contributing  almost 83 percent of total revenues. The two
largest transactions were the beverage producer Beninoise,  bought by the French BGI
Castel for $26.2 million,  and the cement company Sonaci,  which went to a Norwegian
investor  for $13.3 million.
Ghana
After a  long  period of  economic decline during the  1970s and  early  1980s, the
Government  of Ghana initiated  the Economic  Recover Program in consultation  with the
World Bank in 1983.  In line with this program, the Government  also started a public
enterprise reform program.  Not until 1987, however, was concrete action undertaken
with respect to restructuring  these country's large public sector, comprising  about 345
SOEs. From 1989 to March 1993, 60 enterprises  have been divested,  of which 26 were
47Privatisation  Intemational,  Yeaibook  1991,  p.206.
41liquidated  and 34 sold. 48 Overall, the progress in privatizations  in Ghana has been slow.
While the number of companies  advertised  for sale is usually large, most of them are
unattractive to  investors because of their bad performance.  Some large privatization
transactions were, however, completed such as  Lever Brothers,  Continental Hotel,
Achimota  Brewery, Ghacem,  and West African  Mills,  often with foreign  participation. In
total, Government  of Ghana earned about US$37.5 million  from these sales with about
US$21.2  million  in foreign  exchange.
Nigeria
Prior to 1988, when it launched  its privatization  program, Nigeria  had around 140 SOEs,
which accounted  for 30-3  5 percent of GDP and 20 percent of f-rmal sector employment.
During  the period 1988-92,  Nigeria  became  the strongest  privatizer  in sub-Saharan  Africa,
having  sold 29 major entities  for a total of $1 10 million. The largest transaction  was the
sale of  the  Lagos Federal Palace Hotel for  50  million, but  numerous entities in
agribusiness,  cement production,  and even the petroleum  industry  were sold.  In order to
encourage  wider  share ownership,  individual  share  values  were held  extremely  small,  while
no single  investor  was allowed  to hold more than one percent of the shares  on offer. This
might explain  the virtually  complete  absence of any foreign  investors in the privatization
process.
Togo
In  1975, the government engaged in a  strong expansion of its SOEs.  But after an
unsatisfactory  performance  of these companies,  Togo became one of the first African
nations to privatize  its public  sector.  Between 1984 and 1987, the government  sold 11
rni9jor ROPqRn  cnndiicted  hv the Miniktry  of State Enterprises.  Durinz the period 1988-92,
another 6 large SOEs were sold, primarily  manufacturing  enterprises,  for a total of $28
rillion.  All  of  these  transactions irnvolved  foreign participation, rendering this
privatization  program  the most open one to foreign  investors  in the region.
F North Africa  and the Middle  East
Tunisia
During  the 1960s  and 1970s, the Tunisian  government  created a sizable  public  sector that
accounted  for about one fourth of the country's  national  product and employed  about one
tenth of the working  population  in the early 1980s. Privatization  was first announced  as
an economic  policy with the development  of the VI, social and economic  development
plan at the beginning  of the 1980s. After passing the necessary  legislation  and an initial
restructuring  of the enterprises  listed for privatization,  the first substantial  sales occurred
in 1988.  Since then, a total of about 65 enterprises  have been liquidated  or partially  or
totally privatized.  Of these,  33  enterprises amounted to  sales of  significant size,
generating  about US$100 million  in government  revenue. Foreign  participation,  however,
is not particularly  strong with only three transactions listed involving  foreign investors.
48  The Government  claims  that a total of 48 companies  were sold during  the period, but the status  of 14
pi-ojecis  is wucicair  ui;cause  of differenceb  bcwecri investors  and the government.
42APPENDIX
The data presented  in Tables  A-I and A-2 are based  on a wide variety  of sources, ranging
from newspaper  articles  to World Bank  reports. A basic  data set was obtained  from Scott
Schulz at Fin Mark Research Inc. (Castleton-on-Hudson,  N.Y.), which included basic
information on  many privatization transactions worldwide.  This  information was
enhanced  by data from the Privatization  International  Yearbook (various  issues). All data
on industrialized  country privatizations  is based on these two sources, and no additional
information  was obtained.
With respect to developing  countries,  additional  data was gathered from a wide range of
sources. For a number of countries  such as Honduras,  Hungary,  Peru, Portugal, Turkey,
or Venezuela,  the corresponding  country  department  of the World  Bank was contacted  in
order to obtain more detailed and comprehensive  information. Many thanks to all the
country  officers  and economists  involved  for their help and support. Special  thanks goes
to Antonio  Estache,  an economist  at the World Bank (SASVP),  whose comments  as well
as support in obtaining data on South Asian privatizations  was most valuable.  Some
information  was obtained directly  from the privatization  agency in the country or from
local organizations involved in domestic privatizations,  especially in Latin American
countries. For privatizations  in Latin America,  LatinFinance  proved to be an interesting
source for transaction  information,  legal aspects,  and contact  names.
In terns of Eastern Europe, special thanks to Maziar Minovi,  a consultant  at the World
Bank (CFSPS), without whose data and support the collection of information  on the
former  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  and Poland  would  have turned into an ordeal. This data
is mostly compiled  from publicly  available  media reports and, when possible, double-
checked with personnel  within the World Bank as well as privatization  ministries  in the
countries. While  the Polish and Hungarian  data appear to be quite accurate,  the data on
the former Czechoslovakia  raise some doubts in terms of the dollar amounts involved.
But no better information  could be obtained  through  the World Bank country mission  or
the privatization  ministry  itself
The foreign exchange  component  of each transaction  was typically  not directly available
and had to be estimated,  based on the nationality  of the buyer. With respect to consortia,
an equal participation  of the individual  members  was assumed,  if no additional  information
was available. When revenue information  was available  in local currency only, it was
converted into dollars based on  the end-of-year exchange rate  as  published in  the
Intemational  Financial  Statistics  by the International  Monetary  Fund.
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Forelpt 
Fpul Yaw  Compay  County  S_*r  Equ  Shae  Amout  Exans_  Fkni  MOON  PrImo(s)  PROCEDS  E  -s (in %) 1988  Austal  Argentina  ewhno  100.0  280  00  debtilsunmsd byGGA  ClodalSur 1990  ENTEL  (North)  Argentna  Telecommunications  800  8210  485.8  510Min cash.  $2 S8n DES  STET-Th_l  Franoe  Teleom. Pere  Conwin.,  JP Morgan 1990  ENTEL  (South)  Argentina  Teleconnunications  80o  836.0  4198  $114Mn  cash.  $2.728n DES  Cilank.  Tonic  ds  E,am.  TwchintGroup 1990  Canal 1I  Argentina  tlavesaon  1000  82  0.0  15-yer concession  Television  Fedea 1990  Canal 13  Argentina  television  1000  57  0.0  15-yearoconcasion  NUhRslitsR-leviwoArgsnw  SA 1990  Awrolnas  Argentines  Argertina  Arhnas  570  50.0  139.2  $280Mncsh. $181Bn  DES.  24%foreign  IberiaAibconorm 1990  Patopol  Argentina  peloleurdpetochemic  30.0  6*9  0.0  $4.511n  cash. $12IMn  DES  Indup  SA 1990  Inducbr  Argentna  pelolaunVparochrnic  30 0  27  9  00  $17.8Mn  cash. $506 Mn DES  Indup_ SJL 1990  Monomenos  vinflicos  Argenbna  petoleum/prochenmic  30 0  1418  00  $9 SMn  cash, $28.5Mn  DES  Vinicbr Sk 1990  Potisr  Argnbna  Chemica  30.0  22 3  00  $14.1Mncash.  $4IMn DES  IPAkOSit 1990  YPF  (37  secondary  dringares)  Argentina  petolaum  NIA  2509  771  Cedipee Wers.  rbh  Gas 1990  Vaidad Maconel  Argentina  roads  NIA  250.0  00  concession  on 10.000km  of natoio  highways  Argarsconsortta 1991  Frroexprso  Parpeano (Rosaro-Beh  Binca)  Argentna  Ratroeds  NWA  1100  55.0  5050 spit  assumed,  $SO1Mn  fuure inve_tinsnt  Techmt.Conk  del Plet.  Ches  ACA.  toae Rosad 1991  Rakona  Argenbts  deergents  1900  20.0  200  ProcderWenble 1991  La  Cltulosa  Argentna  Pulp  & Paper  Products  100.0  3000  3000  $900Mn  DES  (estimaled)  Cicrp  Cap  Ivestor 1991  YPF  (S  prmaydriyling ares)  Argntine  ptroleum  50.0  8585  401 ajoit  ventures  loraln  ktaowns 1991  YPF  (22  secondary  driNng reas)  Argenbna  ptrolbumn  N/A  1405  422  lattnraginvesetrs, 1991  Enlt (rebfonica de Argentina)  Argentna  Telecommunications  300  8S00  3840  GDRa  krain  invanars 1991  Radio  shtions (8)  Argentna  Telecomiounications  N'A  N/A  N/A concession  local mvaeo 1991  Sante  blens  Argennbna  Foodstuff  1000  N/A  N/A token  aum  paid  Huancwoy&  Aicorp 1991  Lho-Liao Hotl  Argentbna  hotel  1000  89  42$3  7Mn  cash. $12Mn DES  Citiorp  Cap  tent  Choice Heoa  Inft  Coke  ySur SA 1991  Tandanor  Argentna  Ship  Buildeg  1000  598  299  B ncoHdolend  Unido Sud  MarinSek  locbal  enrur 1992  Hipodromo  Argentno  Argentine  horsracng  track  N/A  815  00  25-yar  concession 8.5%on tbo ph  SD%officktetebse bloalr  iwanv 1992  Obres Sanas  daIs Nacmon  Argentna  water supply  N/A  N/A  N/A 30-yea concrasmn  Lyonn  des  Eeux-Durnelcical  maeors 1992  Puerto Oueqin gram  elevator  Argenbna  gram elevator  N/A  29  00  concesion. S3 5/Ton - $4 royatmis  lcal  inv_eew t992  Puero Buenos  A.e  grea. elevator  Argentina  gram  elevator  N/A  11  00  concession.  $on  pkus  515royatie  local  ki  myasS 1992  Puerto  Dlament gram  elevator  Argentna  gran elevator  100  0  2 0  0 0  oal  irnvest 1992  General Mre  Railroad  Argentina  Railroads  1000  1530  00  concession  lroal  isvas 1992  General Urquza Raeiroad  Argentua  Raikoads  N/A  839  00  concession  knsa  Consortum 1992  Deta Borges  Rairoad  Argntine  Raitroads  N/A  NtA  00  concessi  Socied  Cornerwc  dt  Pet 1992  General Roca  Raeord  Argentne  Rdiroeds  N/A  N/A  00  conceson  lcal  mvaa 1992  San Martin  Rtroad  Argentin  Rilroads  N/A  NIA  00  concession  locia  nevs 1992  TransportadoradeGasdelNort,  Argentna  Gas  700  2102  00  S28Mncash.  $36SMnDES(DEStfcevstakeeatinated)  tNve/Trencogwa#Varlin 1992  Datiu"idra  dat Litorol  Argentina  Gas  900  1038  00  S14M1ncash  $`179.2twln  DES (DE-S  tao  vales elinatad)  TracteleMarkronlsfovagolDmcieAte  de  Abrit SA 1992  Transportedora  de Gas  del Sur  Argentna  Gas  700  3582  1781 100Mn  cash,  $512.4Mn  DES (DES  (ace value  estanaleld) Enron/PlrazCoitenCii 1992  Dntribuidora  Panpeane  Argebna  Gas  70  0  2354  2354  $18Mn cash,  $454 8tMn  DES  (DES  (ace  vabe estimated)  Camnzui  Gezonmi  SpA 1992  Dsirhbuidoradel Sir  Argentina  Gas  9000  148  148  $14Mncash.  $288 1MnDES(DES  acevakle ati<maed)  CwinuuziGezomsiSpA 1992  D.tibuldoradel  Centro  Argentma  Gas  900  138t0  1380  $18tMncash,  $24OMnDES(DEShfce  vskusabeimad)  ltelgsioo 1992  Detitbukal  Cuyana  Argentina  Gas  800  1220  1220  $28Mncast, $192MnDES(DES(acevskrmelimel)  ttelaSiieco 1992  Dutirbudora Metopoltana  Argenaa  Ges  700  3000  1500  S44Mn  cash. $512Mn  DES  (DES  fce  vakl estimated)  trah  Gas/PerezComlpeC  ctnvwtad 1992  DttulruaHNoroots  Argentnea  Gee  900  720  00  S1101mn  cash. $124 1 DES  (DES face vakueesdmad)  Carlllon  lo  cs  d  Comumadores, 1992  Duirtbauora Buenos  Aers Norte  Argentbna  Gas  70.0  1558  00  $28tMncah. $255 1MnDES(DES  facevkisesbmated)  GastN_turatDitcogea  ylMsn 1992  YPF  pintveneS  (5)  Argenna  PetoleunrdPtrochsnnc  N/A  5289  180  musy  bcalmvesoln 1992  YPF  (27  secondwary  dtng  areas)  Argentna  PetoleumrPlvochtimic  N/A  871  201  conceson  ant  trc4WrPo  Ow  CorpGroup 1992  AcerosParana  Arkgbna  steel  800  4037  00  $3797Mncah.  96MnDES(DEStfacev  akistbinted)  TechintiSA 1992  SEGBA  (Pueto)  Argenbna  Power  Ulhty  o00  922  922  ChilensehicstC 1992  SEGPA  (Coetnera)  Argentina  Power  Ubtity  8o  0  90 1  45 1  toamtorign  ivess 1992  SEGBA  (Edesur)  Argentna  Power  Utbity  51  0  511  0  3373  3SOMn  cash, $92  n  DES (DES  face value etuimated)  ArganfineClChiltsamS  Consortium 1992  SEGA  (Eden.)  Argentna  Power  lty  51 0  427 9  4279  10Mn  cash,  S798Mn  DES (DES  face valu  atua-lad)  French/Spent  Consorbum 1992  SEGBA  (Dock Sud)  Argentna  PowerwUtity  90  0  25  0  0 0  Poldo  Sk 1992  SEGBA(PedrodeMendoza)  Argentina  Powe UVi*y  900  85  00  Acidar  SA/ Messeh  SA 1992  SEGEA(Edalep)  Argenbna  Pow  Utility  51.0  1390  895  $SMn  cash. $285Mn DES  (DES  fce  vkestinlemetad)  Housan  Ligheing8PowerfTechlmt  SA 1992  Gusmms  Argentne  Power  Utity  oo0  882  431  1lOMn  cash,  515241M DES (DES  fac  value esimated)  loceslloraqn  imsam 1992  Central Sorento  Argentina  Power  Ubtity  900  88  00  $5wincansh.  $7  8MnDES(DES (aceva  etimatbd)  lc  inver 1992  AtoD  Voa  Argentina  Power  Ustty  900  221  11  1  DonuiuonErgyciCoepratna  Provincial 1992  ENTEL (North)  Argentne  Telecommunicatons  300  1,2289  00  pubtic  ofr  private  nvestor 1992  t3ank  of  tl  Province,  o CQrrintes  Argntna  Banking  800  150  150  Banco  del  te  Group 1992  MercadodeHactnda de Lers  Argentina  kvetock market  00  N/A  N/A  10-yeo concesson price.  12%  of otl sicomes  lokalmrchnmtconsortium 1992  At,or/Horno Zapi  Argenbna  Stee  1000  330  185  13  SMn  cash. $59 4Mn DES  (DESe  vaoo  "km  rned)  SIMA  (Fra  t)CitiorwpflPns  SAAPenf  S A  (t9) 1992  SocdedaMntSdarurgm  Argentna (Somtal  Argentina  Steal  799  1521  00  $14OMn  cash, $24 2DES(DESfacevslouesmabtie4  PropuleoSclerirgtcaSAJSmdacaSA  10,7462  4.3S6.1 1991  cuttotd  ltend  Armenia  Agricultural  Enterpris  700  NIA  N/A  WA  00  0.0 1991  Bwrbado Telephone  Company  larbados  Teak,nmuniclmc  ocs  110  N/A  NA  Cabl ana Wirels  (2) 1991  arbados  Extenal Tlsconmmumncatons  Berbdos  Telecommunications  250  N/A  N/A  CobleendWr,els  00  00 1988  Bata  Tealconsmunicabons  Lid  BElta  Telecommuncations  490  144  73  fist  publIc  offer  ariuh  Telcom  (25%) 1990  Betl  Teiscommunceton  Ltd  BEta  Telecommuninations  13  1  84  00  sale of shaes45
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Favt 
F=Wt -w  C0189m1  COaatrY  Sedar  Equkty  Shlw  Amount  Exutp  Fi  olI  Note  PPROEED4  PSD  E  _P (in %)
191  Beliz  l  Tleotntnuncations Ltd.  Belie  Tlecommnurncations  35.4  292  00scond  public  offer  local mves_  (4) i92  Beie EEtericitny  Ltd  Bele  electricity  49.0  69  0.0  also  recered $10.753  Mion  for debenturwe  bocinveear  509  7.3 MO  AGO  Benin  NIA  1000  1.4  NWA  NWA Itl  Soon.  Benin  NtA  100.0  05  N/A  WA 169  Soneci  Benin  cement  100.0  13.3  13.3  Niogan  mve_b 169  (boe  Bono  textiles  100.0  22  N/A  WNA .tO  MUnucia  Bonori  tobacco  100.0  4 3  4.3  Rothimen's 190  SC8  Bono  cem  ent  100.0  40  0.0  ttra  gtiw 191  Sobtitx  Benin  textiles  100  10  N/A  NWA  (8) ?92  Bnirmo  Benin  beverages  1000  26.2  262  BGI Cesle(France)  52.9  43.6 192  Vibmonbs  Edie  OdilsaPnt  Bolivia  Foodsuffs  1000  52  00  Genoe  del trent 192  Criadra d  Truchos  Piusia  Bolivia  tout  breoding  100.0  208  0.0  local mleeirs 192  Fabrica Bdolinode  Ceramca  Bolivia  ceramics  1000  13  0.0  ocel  sweeli )02  Plenta  de Poloa  BB  Bolivia  poultry  100.0  163  0.0  locet  tVeebrs 192  Tet?rdeCeremica  Bovina  ceramics  1000  6.1  0.0  bcl-in5s_r  (a) 192  Fabrics  do Ceramnw.  Rope  de  Oruro  Bolivia  ceramics  1000  173.0  00  local  myeetr  222.6  0.0 A68  oes  by BNOES  Brazi  N/A  N/A  250  0  0 0  local Wivees 169  Colevi  8razd  stool  1000  80  00  Ouferoo 190  Vco  A  reas  Sao  Paulo (VASP)  Brazil  Arlines  600  440  00  plus  assumptmnon  fSO3MM  in  debt  Wgnr  Cnhodo.  enpooe 191  UsinasSiderurgcesde Mins Gersa  Brazd  Steel  750  14911  89.3  599%fortign  pivalv*MrafRa  Vale do  Rio DocaProvi 191  Mers  Brazil  Raifroad&BusEquipm  1000  488  439  splilkS%i10%/5%  FedwelR  odt  ui 911  Cotsmr  Brazil  Steel  1000  150  00  $6OMnOES(OESfacevatueesteniated)  GrupotGwdeu 191  Conpnahia Elctomecanica  (Calma)  Brazi  Awrraft  Services  89 1  91 1  102  spt  76  5%/ 1  i.2%  Banco  foa  Vale GroupGenonrl Electric 12  Potroflx  Industr  a Comarcio  Bracd  Pstro4eun'Petrocherrc  so  0  234 1  00  PIC cruLtm 12  Nlifilex  Brazi  PetroleumPetrochemic  1000  262  00  Local  inveor  consortium 92  SNBP  Brazil  navigation  100.0  120  00  Local inivestr  ornertwn 92  Acest  Brzid  stel  1000  465.4  0.0  Local aeel  cbroornm 92  Altha(CNA)  Brazl  chemicals  100.0  814  0.0  Local  ieoe:  consorbum 92  Pekoquenica  do Sul  Ltd  Braz4l  PetroleunrPatrocherrc  1000  568  00  Local  inwea  coneorium 92  Copesul  Brazd  PetrolaunvPetrochensc  1000  7971  0.0  Loca  i_vor  consortium 492  PPH  Brazd  PelrolaunmPltrochenwc  1000  594  0.0  Loca t=eer  coneoriunm 192  CBE  Brazd  PetrotaurVPatrochemc  100.0  109  00  Local inve  coraortium 192  Acero  Fino  Psrasni  erazd  Stel  889  1079  00  Grupo  Gednu 12  Compenhie  Siderurgica  de Tubarso  Brazil  Steel  700  3474  00  Bozeano  S  _UionsendnibineoCVRD 191  Gobshrbt  Brazd  tertixzer  1000  130  0.0  Local nvlr  conorteum 192  Foser"i  Brazd  fertbizer  100.0  182.0  00  LOCa  Nvo  coonsortiorn  (21) 192  Indeg  Brazi  trbzlier  1000  68  00  Locl  einv rconsortiun  4 348.4  143A 191  Uinora  nk  Bulgaria  Banking  N/A  N/A  NUA  NWA 191  Nellochim  Buogri  Ptobleuin/Petrochenw  NWA  N/A  N/A  WtA  (S) S11  Balecaer  Bularb  Vehicles  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  0  0.0 188  Compani do Telefonoe  do  Chil  Chile  Telecommunications  495  2780  139.0  Alan  Bond (Auetsb) 68  Huchipabo  Chile  Steel  1000  N/A  N/A  Conp Aorwo del Pac6o 189  CTC  Chile  Telecommunications  130  800  NWA  NWA 19  Ensl  Chile  Talecommunications  30  0  90.0  90.0  Tllontcic  nd Benco  do Santander MO  Pohuenche  Chie  N/A  70  0  90  0  00  Enree  (Chd)
W9  LenChil  Chile  Arlwes  51.0  423  250  ICAROSAN old30% to SAS  ICAROSAN.  SAS W0  Comnpna  do Talefonos  de Chile  Chile  Telbcommunications  N/A  98.0  980  NYSE  offering  privas investors 191  Zonh  France  do Iquique.  S A  Chile  free zone  315  21.5  00  localevt 191  EmpretnMooeradoAysan  Chle  mmin 9 10  117.0  0.0  local eweet 191  Edeow  Chil  energy  170  1865  0.0  locl  inve_ors 191  Empree Eletica  de Ays.n  Chie  energy  87  394  0.0  local zvenetu  (121 92  Tongoy  Chil  service.  N/A  8,0  00  local  uweeir  1.050  6  352.0 S1  ChinaSouthernGlassCompany  China  Glns  149  10.9  109  B'ehre  offering  privaiteinvetors 91  Shanghai  Vacuum Ecron  Device Corporaton  China  ElectricalEleoctroncs  N/A  74.0  740  'B'shre  off.ong  preilvinvets 92  Brilnco  China  Automotre Holdings  China  Automobies  28 7  800  80.0  NYSE  uttering  prate  tnv.w 92  Guengzhou  Invetmnent  China  Rel  Estate  NA  575  57.5  B  share offring  prirat  invsts 92  Shtozh*nZhongchu  Chng  Manufacturing  N/A  0.5  0.5  'B shero offering  prienl  nveeer 92  Shanghai  Rubier Bet Co. Ltd  China  Rubber/Rubber  Produc  N/A  08  0.6  'B  sharo offring  priate  tnnvalnr 92  Dazhong  Taxi  China  Road  Transport  N/A  08  0.  '8'  are  offering  prwae  invroeW s 92  Sheazhen  Sh.ntrz.o  Industrial  China  Beverage  Producer/Bo  N/A  05  05  9 sehare offring  prant  uives 92  Shanghai  Wing  Sung Smtmonary  China  Manufacturing  N/A  10  1.0 'Bshareoffering  pivnate  movet 92  China  Travl  Internatimocal  r.  ntHong  Kong  China  TourinvTravel Agency  250  51a  51.8  'B  shee  offering  priwnievo_el 92  Ha Hong Holdings  China  Chemials  250  119  N/A  N/A  (12) 92  China  Texte Machnery Stock  Lid  China  Toxbbs  N/A  07  0.7  8  share offering  privte  V  as  290.2  276 S46
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(Doar Amounts  in Mimons)
Forign 
F  _Np Yew  Conpey  COW"  SaLAtE  Lulty  Shwe  Atnt  Exhee  Fiua  Notal  P  _ariin  PRDCES  -. (in t%) 1991  Banco  del Comrnc.o  Colombia  Banking  1000  627  0.0  BanoodsBogot 1991  Colombians  Autoimoirc  Colombia  mfanufacturmg  70.0  520  52.0  Maid  5114  Sutffbino 1991  Banco  Tequendame  Colombia  Baniung  1000  370  0.0  B10  deConituai  e 1991  Banco  de bs Trbapsdores  Combria  Banlong  100.0  57  00  BUiOoUc5no 1991  sales by FI (governrent holding)  Colombia  NIA  N/A  25.0  NA  saleot  state-owned  governmmentock  MA 1992  Conass  Colomboa  engering  40.1  1 7  00  Sd-derCango 1992  Fertcol  Colombia  cemncals  99.3  1 7  0 0  local  vesns_ 1992  Penwat  Colombia  chemnicals  59.3  2 0  0 0  lcal  AMirWM  (9) 1992  Puerto  Santa  Marts  Colombsa  PortatDocks  1000  NA  0.0  bcal  inwve  187.8  520 1988  CanrslAzucareradelTernpisque  Coats  Rica  augr  1000  59  0.0  lo  derreblls  (2) 1991  ExperdiosCNP  Cos  Rica  convenience  sors  1000  33  00  worker  ooperrIF  92  00 1<  90  Mtada  Fronts  Dnes  Czecholslovski  Newppaprs/Plrmt  Med  480  220  220  HNwd  (Franoa) 15u2  Libersc manufacturg facibes  Czechobvdakus  Manufacturing  WA  110  110  Rockwell  bf  tonat 1992  deparment  stores (11)  Czechoalovako  Retail  1000  1000  1000  S100OM1nconwotd  KIGat 1992  Lez Jablonec  Czecholslovaki  Vehicles  200  NWA  WA  Mercedes  Beez 1992  Maj  Czecholslovaka  Retail  760  11e  11.8  Knwt 1992  Prior  Czecholslovaek  Retai  97 0  27 8  27  8  $8  3Mn  4uure invesment  Kn_ 1992  Tona  Pecky  Czechotslovekia  tools  87.0  NA  NVA  Staney Wafk  (US) 1992  GCP  Czechosbovakia  consumfr goods  310  WA  N/A  Molelyo  (suilerdiy  Swedish  SCA) 1992  Avm  Czechoblsovak  vehicets  31  0  717  717  S215.2M1n  in 3 yeas. $81 5FAn  kter (proceeod  es_denatad  Mercedes  Bue 1992  Kerosa  Czecholslovake  vehicls  30  0  221  5  221  5  RAauk 1992  Tstmarnst  Czecholvsakm  machnery  43  8  6 0  6 0  S28Mn  futur investment  Whlroot 1992  Bupack  Czechoblovakia  paper  400  313  313  Duered  (Austria) 1992  Vitkovicc  Czechoslovaki  stee  N/A  110  110  josilventure  Age(Sw.de) 1992  CS Cabotspol. so  Czechotslovski  mining  52.0  46.8  203  Cbot  (US) 1992  Bats  CSFR  Czecholslovski  retai  70.0  300  300  $401ni  mis  capizaizaton  sBta  (Cated) 1992  Batrny Praha  Czecholslovakia  Foodstuft  100.0  160  160  Sar  Lee  (DOuth  sutiiy  of  US  comany) 1992  CaVe Mo/vs  Czechobslovaki  Cement  350  603  603  $667 Mn over  10  yeafs  Cimnt_rie  CBR  (Belgaum 1992  Cementarna  Ostrava  Czechoblovskba Cement  684  617  817  ttati 1992  Praszke  Czechoblyvask  Beverage  Producer/Bo  N/A  890  89 0  coca Cob 1992  Czechoslovak  Arwies  Czechoslovakia  Aines  40.0  60.0  60.0  Air Frao  conersionm 1992  Zenostnska  Bank  CzecholWoakia  Banking  520  283  283  F4Wank(Ger.YIFC 1992  S  aerokafon  Czechoovakis  Mim 9 g  340  97  9.7  GeorgelWiepay 1992  Cutism  Czechoblovekm  Foodstufts  NA  27 0  27.0  Teepek 1992  CSTP  Czechobsnvskm  Tobacco  31 0  N/A  NhA  Re  _niam& 1992  Kyle  sofdrik  A snack  lemdity  Czechoblovakm  Beverage  Producer/Bo  1000  6.4  6.4  $82Mn hiture aiveebmnt  Cosa Cola 1992  Decicke  Stoprny  Czechobbvakes  Manufactuing  1000  1200  120.0  $120Mn  comnidied  TRW  (US) 1992  Cokol.dovny  Czecholslovakie  Foodsatus  43.0  1287  128.7  $114 8An over  4 yas  Nealt.  MM.  R  RtD 1992  Ofap  Czechobalovkis  Pulp&Paper Products  1000  344  344  Lekya  Mhbkr 1992  Tabak  Czechobslovabk  Tobacco  300  1044  1044  Ptto,Air 1992  Kteramcke  zavody Top/ice  Czechoblovakia  Manufactbring  100  0  250  250  Amarice Stnrd 1991  Pragocement  Radotn  Czechoslvaka  Cement  40.0  199  199  $15AMn onvemna  ln t year  Heidelborpor(Germony) 1991  Sklo  Union  Czechoslovaka  Gless  11.0  324  32.4  reoasatak  to51%  Gle_erbat 1991  Cikovice Censtarna  Czechoslovakia  Cemant  400  700  70.0  Lalge  Coppe (Franc.) 1991  Cove  Krakv Ove  Czachoslovaka  Cement  NMA  N/A  MA  LhooollHeidelborgr 1991  Tourminves  Czechoslovakia  Hotels  N/A  NVA  IVA  CDC 1991  Patrna  Czechoslovakia  Detegent  51.0  NA  WA  Henkel 1991  Skods  Auto Woks  Czechostovska  Vehicles  31.0  274.7  2747  $824Mn  ove 3 yers,  ,lotalcoanmlmont$5.3Bn  ove 10ye Volkswen 1991  Cornentarna  Prachvice  Czechoslovakia  Coment  300  NWA  WA  Ho_ldutnk 1991  Cementarna Hran  Czechoelovakia  Cetmnt  70.0  620  82.0  $1351ln  over 5 yeas  tceti 1991  Sklo  Unm  Czechoslovakia  Gless  40.0  48.0  480  initil purchas  GIrAl 1991  rachnoptlyn  Czechoslovakia  Gas  N/A  N/A  NWA  Lid 1991  Rakona  Czechoslovska  Oetegent  100.0  200  200  Proctor  &AGini 1991  Bratslavsk Autonmobiove  Zavody  Czechoslovaka  Automobes  N/A  N/A  NIA  Vo&iagen 1991  Brno Engineering  Works  Czechosloveak  Manufacturing  NWA  NA  N/A  NWA  (55) 1991  Szoport  Czechoslovaka  Manufactuing  100.0  N/A  M/A  spt  90%1  10%  ttXFO4D  1,9088  1882.3 1992  Chemton  Czech-Slvokr  Chencae  52.0  NA  N/A  Rhonoulenc 1992  CTSP  Br_lgleve  Czech-Slovaki  Tobacco  310  NWA  N/A  Reenda_  (3) 1992  Kablovna  Brateleva  Czech-Slovask  Cable  N/A  NWA  N/A  S5nsn  0.0  0.0 1992  East  Pnm-Eet  Mdk  Ltd  Eaton..  Agricukural  Entsrprm  350  38.0  t/A  A-VallD 1992  Taflnn Margarie  Factory  Estons  Foodstuft  300  NWA  MA  Unikf 1992  Saku  Eatn..  Brewery  600  NtA  NMA  alc Se-eagtoag 1992  Kunda Cemnt Works  Etonis  Cement  35.0  WA  NWA  Ad  Cement  (5) 1992  Ees  Tale  Eatonia  Telecommunications  49.0  NA  NtA  TYv.TF  ind  380  0.0 1989  GEA&Assoc,sta  Ghana  NMA  1000  01  00Tabie A-i  47
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(Dobr A  _eonb  in  ilnal
Yew  C  _epm  CO_uy  Ser  Eqmdl  Msn.  ASI  El  Rl  Ma  lalP  S
(In %) t989  M*CTEX  Factory  Ghana  F  eeth  1000  0.7  0.0  hosg_ 900  TwoWahnuhtrnuactn  Ghna  manulaclrmg  WA  0-2  0.0  bow, 1990  Overses Kniww  & Frabrs Led  Ghann  WA  01  0.0  bh  lrs 1090  0  1 Slel  Ltd  Ghan  SW  WA  01  0.0  bo  w' 190g  Mateloolkt  Ghan  nnukounmg  WA  0A1  0.0  bd  iw 1990  Ree&sCo  Lid.  Ghan  IWA  WA  01  0.0  bea  l 190  Lover  eo&au  Ghona  de_ergn  250  55  5.5  UAC 1990  Con6tental  HoWl  Ghana  howl  1000  3.6  8  US  tv 1990  Apmndo Poulty  Ghana  Agricaulual  EnW  1000  01  0.0  loc  mve  s 1990  GIHOC  Gbts  Fadry-Aboao  Ghana  mnanubducgr  WA  0.5  0.5  3-yetr  tAUK-Winno 1090  GHC  lee and Cold  Lid  Ghan  manuacturg  1000  01  0.0  blutdomon  beo 1W91  GIHOC  Sloalrrks,  Ghana  see  8060  21  2.1  US-_v 1991  GIHOC  Motor  A Mche  Shop  Ghana  wnunlac3uwg  1000  03  00  dG  h,l_ 1991  Achmnob  Brwery  Ghn  brewery  100.0  82  0.0  boDw 1991  Cabrtg  R-  St  HOUSWCAIMCOMA  Ghan  reeurzant  100.0  0.1  0.0  btcl 1991  NoplnGlwna  Ghna  t4A  IWA  0.  0.0  bodw 1901  Ghan  Alurniium-Tne,  Ghana  ntab  WA  02  02  UK-aweag 1992  Ghacom  Ghan  cNmt  WA  41  4.1  uS4wa 1992  No."  Ghana  menuusfrg  WVA  1.2  0.0  hocd  _  el, 1992  W"a Aiwan  Mli  Ghana  Auarsl  Entrprs  WIA  52  52  JoiI veni,.  Gerawa  awe- 1992  Iran,  reews  Gh_a  WA  nWA  1.S  00  odabealda 1992  Guinnss  Ghana  lid  Ghan  brewry  WIA  24  0.0  bhc  v  (24t 1992  PNoner  Toacco Lid  Ghana  tobacco  WA  1.0  0.0  bhc  lu  375  212 1988  Inhonis  Hondura  lxnit.re  WA  0.5  0s  0  local h_a 19E88  Mea  Honduras  oianufacug  WA  0.3  0S0  bcd _w 19NB  Aysa  Hond_a  suge  WA  5-6  0 0  bhol 1g88  siC  HondKuras  oniuScon  WFA  0.4  00  local 1988  PeCen  Honduras  pPPr  WA  .5  5.5  s5oSP 1988  Conasa  Honduras  hrnir-  WA  8 9  8.9  Wellngton 1089  HoAsl  Ptera  Honduras  hotel  WA  5.8  0 0  hwo  _now 198g  Sacf  Hoeduree  plantaton  WA  0 3  0.3  SP5A_ih 19°0  Indoco  Honduas  constuctDt  nuers  WA  01  0.0  bhlo log990  nprent  e  "ISS  Honduras  prminla  WA  01  0 0  - logo  Locomape  Hondr  Luber  WA  08  a  00  hod  L"I 1991  Transport  s  Aece  Ncmionsl  Honduras  Aueras  410  05  05  TACA  (EI  Savdor) 1991  Incehen  Honduras  mentd  1000  8.2  00  S12Un,over  10yuows  bhodteIath 1991  ProInco  Hondwr_  nuhter  WA  01  0.0  bho  _wr 1991  Fina  Ste Roan  Hondura  plasnabon  WA  07  0.0  bho  wam 1992  A"  Hondurs  manufacurintg  WA  17  00  jood  L.aa'l 1992  Cored  Honduras  procsg  WuA  0.1  01  Span"  _rteb 1992  0SfaI  Hondura  hXl  Nit  12  0.0  hod  movee 1992  Inaaro  Hondura  stel  ?WA  22  0.0  hodaln  r 1992  Crnenb  de Honduras  Honduras  cement  WA  151  00  hodbaliooltacn  n 1992  bshlas  Honduras  pontiabon  WA  0.2  00  hdcnl 1992  Hotel Brs  del ago  Honduras  H0tO15  1000  0.8  0.0  hdal 1992  Hol  Powdas de  Copan  Hondura  Hotels  100(0  0.6  00  hb  eal  ner 1992  Hold Tener  Honduras  Hol.  510  1 1  00  blow  (25) 1992  Plants  S.te  Hondurm  Foodstuhs  1000  3 1  00  hoc  mln  615  133 1989  Genz Elebdic  Meters  Hungary  rneouclturssg  75.0  88  8.6  S.hrmerger  teua 1989  Tungsram  Hungay  manubocturng  49.7  110.0  1.0o  Generda  Elaoe 1989  IU.SZ  Hungary  TournrnflravelAgency  400  100  10.0  _nwdr  GoaseWSlra 1989  Hunger.E  Btalto  Hungary  Insurance  49.0  500  50.0  Ala  Veriche.atg 1989  Rabe  Hungary  rAundurmg  WA  150.0  150.0 5150 Mn  conwnoed  Gen"rl  Mer 1989  Salgotareu  irm  Hungay  Stl  1000  830  830  Eoldroelub  (Strdn) 1989  Inlerhank  Hungary  balknkg  20.0  10.0  10.0  h_  Seo  Pa.do 1990  Pac  Prmng House  Hungary  Prmting  a Packgsing  200  NWA  WA  Huagen  AWican  Entprure  Wt 1990  (MOIL  Hungary  Nnspaperes/Prt Mad  1000  WA  WA  Sp-agr GnQ 1990  VNMH  Hungay  NwsaperslPrtm  Mad  WA  WVA  IvA  WAZ 990  IBlUSZ  Hungary  TomurniTravl Agency  50  32.0  13.1 41A%  br  fgoteienc.alawes  pret  ne_es 1990  Chnon  Hungary  Pharnuceutbrib  400  60o  60.0 S80Mn  cotsmilad  Seab  (France 1990  Pa"  Priing HrOcn;  Hungary  Prnting  & Packaging  50D  75  75  Col1, 1990  Genra  rPnkeg  a Trust  Company  Hungary  Senkeg  500  100  100  Centrd Euepen  Davele-  Corp 1990  Fo,dHunger.  Hungary  vuihles  1000  oo0  80.0  $56  n  corntd  Fod 1990  Hungrhtl  Hungary  hote  WA  60o0  0.o  Saome  cofninjd  Obero. (l.) 1990  S-ehdeglhsz.  Szoau,ermVadikl  Hungary  augr  490  350  35-0  A-  (Ausia)8~~~~~~~  ill~  i
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Privtizatlon  Transactons In Developing Countrles- 198S-1992
(Dole  Amount,  in  bion)
Fvml  F YOw  C*m4uy  Cwe"  Ser  Equdy  Sh_  A  _ua Em  _be  F_oe  l Note.  pwdan.  PKJCES2S  E  a_
(in %)
1902  Hungrowvin  Hungary  Sprit  ProducerslMorc  79.5  17.0  17.9  Hard  end  Sdint  (Am")
1902  Malev  Hungary  aSSe  35.  65.0  65.0  AeoBt (a)
1992  SsliauJ(ily  Dohanygyar  Hungary  Tobacco  87.0  WA  NIA  RJRIco
1992  Dune lntbrcontinental  Hungary  Ho,sts  100  0  20.0  20.0  S2OMn  conmtd  ar
1992  NOW  Kanlz  Hungary  Brewey  1000  NtA  NA  _mnept 1902  VUTV  Hungay  Foodstutfs  100.0  10.0  10.0  U  _1dver
1902  Knr Nyomdn  Hungary  Prnting  & Packaging  85.0  20.0  0.0  COFIPEC  (Hungy
1002  *Ngat  Hungary  Rebtd  58.0  NMA  NIA  C_n"9*4&-M
1992  Oui  KIt  Hungary  consume goods  97.0  33.9  33.9  SkolneikAG(Grnwny)
1902  Aldi  Porolean  Rt  Hungary  budding  nmterial  640  12 1  12.1  VbraY a Bach  (Geriy) 1002  Svrnca food facory  Hungary  Foodetuft  400  13.3  1.3  estimated  procedo (S40Mn  for 3  dea)  FnMzi
1992  Foanow Foto  V  k  st  Hungary  Rbil  100.0  3 0  3.0  Pant
1992  Cement  and  Umn  tndusty  Hungary  Cement  33.0  6.0  80  B  _Iw  ge 1902  Ma  tavd  Hungary  Sugwr  40.0  13.3  13.3  eatimatd proceeds  (4014n1or3deals)  Fmarui
lo2  Sopron  Brewy  Hungary  Brewery  375  4.8  4.8  Oeteunithmlai Bu  AG
1992  Debrcn  Tobacco  Factory  Hungary  Tobosco  82.0  15.4  15.4  R  _ente
1992  Szoxokeugerfccnrty  Hungay  Sugar  400  13.3  13.3 estimated  proceeds  4OMn  for  3tdels)  Fwrum.
1902  Abiu  Bosettb  Hungary  Insurance  75.0  500  50.0  Asgos
1992  Dineg  Hungary  Steel  80.0  1195  50.8  Vpti
4
0%t40%  NuevaawbwSunuda
1902  P  Tobaco  Factomy  Hung y  Tobacco  100.0  360  36.0  tAh  Africn  Tobacco
1902  Donichim  Hungary  PtI  50.0  NtA  NIA  DM  C  _eao
1992  Uicroystmrn  Technical  8 Coputr  Engneering  Hungary  Comnputers  28.0  54  3.0  split  151Xt13%  EBROOHongerson  Amen  Enrpme  Fund 1992  Ounatvroe  ae  plant  Hungry  Siel  50.0  31.0  31.0  Vosel-piAp  ids  (Ausde)
1002  Intrcuokot  Hungary  Sutgar  97.0  38.0  380  NeI  (CHM)
1992  Gyor Kkat  Hungary  Foodslas  84.0  IWA  NWA  tUntd  'lcute
10.2  Hsjdu  iCutkxgyw  Hungary  Sugar  300  20.0  20.0  To".6Lyle(UqK  (141) 1002  PxHiunen Risk  Managament  Hungary  SonlwrisDat, Procra  MA  WA  MA  TSBGrup  2.480  5  230C8t 1991  IndustralCrdit  ndWnvaabontCorpoflnds  Indi  Finance  Companes  270  35.7  NA  WA
1992  NabonatAininumCo  lndis  Metelurgical  5.0  WA  NtA  NtA
1902  Hindotn  Zinc  rid  Metargical  5.0  NIA  NWA  NtA
1002  h_t  Ptrolkum Corp  Indi  PerolkumilPtrochrmsc  50  134  00  lo  wmeainy
1902  SteelAuirity  of India  Indh  Setet  50  70.8  0.0  st_te  bsAmielaltond.
lo2  Hindustan  petroleum  Corp  In<di  Pefroteum/Pelrochrnic  5.0  11.1  0.0  lcki  mnws  (7) 1902  IrdAn Petirocherrcals  Corporation  Indis  Pa#oleurnlPefrochc  8.0  105.8  0.0  loa  MVin _ee  2368  00 1091  PTSam"nG_Gla  Indon_e  Cment  2867  1480  NtA  WtA  1480  0.0 198t  Telecom  Jica  Tabcomrnunicnaons  130  19.0  NA  OVA
1060  Telcon  Jamai  Tacoimnunicatons  200  42.0  420  Cable  &  W-(..  (U.K)
1990  TecR  Jamnica  Tlconmunicaoons  20.0  42.0  42.0  Cob  &tW*bIts UKtt)
1991  Telcm  J.nwica  Telecomnnnications  20.0  42.0  420  Cabl £ Wire_ee
1991  West  Inde  Gb  Co  Jamaica  mnufacturing  WA  2.5  0.0  lowca  aoars
1991  Radio  Jamia  Jamaca  Teeconmunications  25.1  0.8  0.0  lcil  bn  v  (7) 1992  NitonCo_necialBank  Jamaica  BEnking  39.0  23.0  WA  MA  1713  1280 1908  Kenya  Commercial  Bank  Kny"a  bankng  20.0  B0  WA  WNA  (2) 100.0  Knya  Commrrcial  Bank  Knya  banking  10.0  12.0  NWA  WA  20.0  00 1992  Akdria  Lar"  Brewery  60.0  NA  NtA  Belc Beveag  Hotidg  00  00 1990  Ederins Omobil Nawnal  Malaia  menutacksmg  30.0  57.0  NWA  NWA
1000  Syardiak  TaTom  Maysm  Bhd  Makyia.  Talonnunications  23.9  871.0  NtA  MA
1900  Naonal Ecicily  Board  Matlysia  eactricity  NWA  11.0  N'A  WA
1991  Kedah  Cement  Mlaya.,  Coment  NA  22.0  0.0  pubIc  iteu  local  k  nsar_
1091  STM  core  bond  Maxsyasi  WA  NtA  190.0  0.0  WA
1991  Peruahlan  Obmobil Nrsiol  Mtaei  Autnmobisa  300  MA  WItA  xubuiahi
1991  PorttKengConbeenw  Maysa  htipping  NWA  135.0  WA  MA
low2  atya  Aairn  ln  Mlaya.  Arrnaa  NtA  80.0  NWA  rgbtoofearing  NMA
1992  Tlshrn  Maysa  Matyaia  Tlecommunications  3 0  250  8  NWA  NWA
1992  Ten  hNeioned  Barbed  Malaya.  Power  Utilty  230  1.2000  NA  WA
1092  Paruxa an  Obmoni Naional  Malaysa  Automobie  300  3000  NtA  WA  (12) 1992  wtr  supply Jaor  State  Makaya  water  WA  175.0  80.3  5149Osptit  Lyoneale De  EuxeDuoOmoLAnstantian  anumk  3.90.8  89.3 1908  Teretetos  Mr xicanoi  Mexico  enrwgy  422  106.0  00  Petocel
1968  Mexicr;AdeCotar  Mexico  Mining  58.0  1380.0  0.0  consorbuin  unde Jorge Larr
18o  NikkoHotla  Mexico  Servica  510  110.0  50  050/50apitiasuumed  Jan-Mao  Nm  hotelrasant 198t  Aarovi.s de  Mexico  Mexico  Ainre,  100.0  3300  00  Dictum  Group  and  ASPA  (pilot unmi) 19000  Maxiwan  Mexico  Airnon  33  0  140.0  00  consolium under  Grupo  Xibra 1900  Telaono. de Mexico  (TELMEX)  Mexico  Telcommunications  20.4  1 7B0.0  824  split  5%15%I  104%  Soublweatern  BelFrance TtF conlGrupo  Coreo 1990  Compeni  Mmer de Cananea  ioopper)  Mexico  minng  100.0  475.0  00  M0ewsMxico  Aecnion  M  smGlM) 1990  Comnpen,  Rel  t Monte  y Pachuca  Mexico  mnining  1000  750  0.0  Grupo  Autey50
Prlvatlzaffon Transactions  In Developing Countres-  1988-1992
(DOLAr  Amounts  m Milkens)
Forin  Fer Ya  Compay  County  Secr  Equity  Shwe  Amous  Exohange Fnnil  No_s  -w  )  PROCEEDS  E-
(in %)
1990  Indusiers Conasupo  (selected  asses)  Mexico  agrobusiness  1000  750  750  Unilever  NV
1990  Meamox  Meaxio  seal  666  80  0  400  each  company  scqured 33.3%  equily  Thyssen  Edaatehl,  Acwmox 1990  19  sugarm  is  Mexico  agrobusmness  1000  1000  NWA  IWA
1991  Siderorgica  del Balbs  MaxKCO  Steal  100  0  25  0  00  $25 Mn  cash. $195  Mn assumed  debl  Grupe  Carbban  [spal
1991  Silerurgca Lazro  Cardenas-Las  Truchas  Mexico  Steal  800  1700  00  Grupo  Vtcro
1991  BencaCromn  Mexico  Banking  667  2470  00  Multivblore
1991  Banco  de Credo y Servicot (Bancreser)  Mexico  Banking  1000  1410  00  local nveor  group
1991  Banco  Nacional  de Mexico  (Banarnex)  Mexico  Banking  70  7  3.235  0  0 0  AocioDnes  y Vabres/loca8  avator  group
1991  Emprasas  Gaesa  Mehxco  Beverage  Producer/So  700  3200  3200  Ppei  Cole
1991  Benpais  Mexico  Banking  1000  1820  00  local wnvesar
1991  Mulsbanco  Mercanbil  Mexico  Banking  77  0  202 7  0 0  Grupo  Fmanciero  Probix
1991  Bancomer  Mexio  Banking  626  25400  6382  GDRs  Vee  Monterreyprwale  ivetars
1991  Telelonos  de Mexico  (TELMEX)  Mexco  Te!scommun,cautnn  15  7  2 363  0  2.3630  ADSs  for 1600 1-eshares(non-ooqng)  Grupo  Com,  France  Telecom.  Soutxwealern  BSll 1991  Banco  de  Oriente  Mexico  Banking  69 3  73  0  0 0  Grupo  Merge
1991  Banca  Contia  Mexxo  Banking  786  2970  00  Case  de Babe  Aboa
1991  BancoBCH  Msxxo  Banking  1000  2930  00  bcal iveskir  group
1991  Atos Honosde  Maxxco  Mexico  Steal  1000  145  0  00  $145  Mn cash.S350  Mnaasumud  debt  GrupoAceredelNorto
1991  Tlelinos  de Mexico  Mexxco  Telecommunicatons  5 0  467 3  467 3  Soufvaaarn  Bel
1992  Mexicnsn  Mexxo  arsne  N/A  347  00  Corporecion  Faloon
1992  Albemsx-Recd,a  Mexxo  fod  N/A  1 7  00  ARIC  Suparcion
1992  Licensa-Lmea  UHT  Mexico  mik  N/A  11  0 0  Promowa Expres
1992  Conloladora Pna  Coloredo  Mexico  steal  N/A  1177  00  [Sp8Laxicaa
1992  Compasn  Azucaera del  lngenio BaIvistle  Mexico  sugar  N/A  104  00  Union  National da  Cameos
1992  PaIrineoro  deata  Uidad de Concrril  Mexico  tea bulding  N/A  226  226  Boreberd
1992  AselblroUnrlosdeMaazedna  Mexice  ship  bulding  WA  06  00  Grupo  Shwe
1992  Ceramins.  y Ladr,Ios  Mexxo  conse.ucton  N/A  03  00  Ptict  Travmo
1992  Nutrmex  Mexico  foed  NA  0 6  0 6  Aro-LSsee  lngredants  Corp
1992  Mane  Carbonlre  Ri  Escondido  Mexico  mining  NA  99  00  Mines  Enrgs  dal  None
1992  Grupo  Industrial  NKS  MexO.o  steal  tA  34 0  0 0  Proinoanra  da Emprses GM
'992  Compan. Oporadora  de  estecionws  (ncl 30  gas  stat  Mexico  gas  stations  100  0  22 0  0 0  Hixdoean
1992  Roce  Fostora Maxicana  Mexico  mining  NtA  21  0 0  Grupe  Empreswnrl  del  Bap
1992  Productura  Mexxcana  de Tuheria  Mexrco  stel  NA  5 6  0 0  Tubacoroitapal
1992  MulbbancoComernex  Mexico  Banking  665  8712  00  Auasbn  Lgprreb  Group
1992  Compinp Nactonal  de  CarroT  de Ferrocarril  Mexico  Manufacturing  100  0  be 0  680  $46  6 Mn  assumed  debt  Bomnbwdir
1992  fBnco Intarsacnal  Mlexco  Banking  51  0  474 4  0 0  Grupo  Fianciaro Prrado Mexoceno
1992  BancodelAlAbnco  Mexco  Banking  68f6  4715  00  Grupop  ureseill  Anrano
1992  Banco  dt  Canlro  Mexxco  Bankmg  66  3  277  3  0 0  Muubr GF
1992  BcoN Mexicano  Somex  Mexico  Banking  81  6  6033  00  Grupo  wovrnuxn
1992  Genca  Sotti  Mexico  Banknmg  510  9112  0 0  Grupo  Fitncro  OBSA
1992  BancoM rcanbt'slNcrte  Mexxo  Bankmg  660  5670  00  GruPo  °sece
1992  BancoPromex  Mexico  Bankmg  660  3447  00  Velbre  F_wnss Group
1992  Banoro  Mexx  o  Banking  66  0  364  7  0.0  Rodollo  EBqur Group  (76) 1992  Fertirmx  Ammonioum  Noate (8 plants)  Maxxo  lrtldzer  100  0  260  3  0 0  bocal  inveson  20.797  9  4.9121 1992  Socat  leDerives  de  Suae  (Soders)  Morocco  augr  derwuaruve  333  33  33  Leada  (France)  33  33 1992  Marbhea  LDA  Mozambatue  fishng  600  23  1 5  IrnnJohnlinon, RSA  (40%)
1992  GembIea  LDA  Mozainbique  fehrng  600  09  08  Nel  Ocxn.  RCAf40%)
1992  Sunlee  LDA  Mozrmbique  hrobing  400  04  04  NewttOcn. RCA(40%3
1992  Fabtixa  de  Rigerante  sda Machava  Mozambrque  beverages  600  1 4  1 4  Sunush. RSA  (60%)  (5) 1992  Fabrce  de Rerigwantsda  Bers  Mozambque  beverages  600  09  09  Feelbure5Sula8_ro.  GOf.  Lid. UKQZnbhsibe  (60%)  59  48 1992  8hrrkub  Paper  Mfs  Nepal  manulacturrg  100  0  5 4  0 0  Hioh  Pipe  Prirl  Lid
1992  Bansbarn  Leater  and Shoe  Factory  Nepal  minulacluring  100  0  0 5  0 0  Lirag  tadi  Lid (inds)  (3) 1992  Hranddhi Brink  and Tie Fctory  Nepal  menufactrrng  1000  54  00  Sundariell  Shaboani  end NersBighahdr  Sirethe  11.3  00 1989  Ngeun  YnY  ast&Alcohol  Pic  Niger  agrobusmres  1000  04  00  oal linvesto
1989  ImprerdEakaor  Pic  Nigern  WA  1000  07  0.0  blcal sNvwe
I198  Drhb  HoNloa  Pi  Nwr  hobtel  1000  51  0-0  bca  er
1969  Arren  Petroleu,,  Pi  Niger  petroleum  N/A  42  0.0  bcal  tmesse
1989  NationaiOChsmrcalMarketing Co Pic  Nxgr.  ptolum  NvA  43  0.0  blc  sivans
1989  CmerentCo  of  Nortern  Nigeri Plc  Nigr.a  cement  MA  91  00  lcal lineebn
1990  flour  md  of Nigrre Pi  Niger.  agrobuseme  1000  07  00  bca  liesns
1990  Abs Tere  inda  Ngwer.  agrobuemes  100  0  2 2  0 0  lol  inveeor
1990  Asiak  Coment  Nigr.a  cement  1000  50  MIA  N/A
1990  Benus  Cemant  Niwr.  cement  1000  50  WA  WA
190o  Okomnu  Od  Palm  Nger.a  agrobuess,  100  0  3 0  NWA  N/A
1991  Ayp Eku  Oi Peln  Nigr.  Cnasmals  N/A  1 5  0.0  p  sinv
1991  13  insurance  cmpanes  Nigeria  finance  1000  71  00  blcl  sweat51
Privatfzadon Transactlons In Developing Countrles- 1988-1992
(Dotr  Amfountm M  Vi)
FanWgn
nite  crpa  Couty  Saclor  EqaIt  Sl.  Arnmont Efxcha  FlawulalN  dtaa  Paaut  PROCES  P
(in%)
1991  lN1lSalConpOwny  Nqis  SaN  NWA  1.0  0.0  irEa_ sIsflam t991  Uniel  Ngi..  P.#otaurriPeochrniac  N/A  97  0.0  priaft  msoc. 1992  Niger  EngisenrigConsaructionConany  Niger  Engineering  80.0  I  N/A  konalProvalent  Fwid  (29) 1992  La  t  FedePalwc  Hot  Nigeria  Hodl  100.0  S00  NIA  k4a. Noah  I11A  0.0 1990  Pakisbtn  Intabonal  AMba  Pakian  Aiaroi  100  110  0.0  pubic imsue  bowal  mves 1191  Ahd  Bank  Pakitan  Banking  280  198  00  _5a
1901  AFGhiiTrn  Pakistn  mnufacturng  NWA  42  4.2  joM vAntor  foreign wmv 1991  Fal  Ve  geable Glu  Pakitn  food  procsg  NWA  0.8  0.0  loalseer 1991  Mulat  Coneiaal  Bank  PakWa  Beanking  26.0  380  0o0  NHatioluIoap
1992  U  t  Tracter  Pakstan  manufactring  51.0  49  0.0  rnmngemubuy-s
1992  BaocehanWhe.teLk  Pakistan  nanuacturing  N/A  43  0.0  ocal 
1992  fl  MOLon  Ltd  Pakitn  manutacurxing  NWA  24  00  lb  _w  r 1992  Pak-Suzul Meter  Co  Pakst  nwnufectureg  N/A  6.9  69  Sutuki
1992  AnExota  (P4Litd  PakiAn  cba  dricab  NWA  0.4  00  blol  _  wate 1992  Kroram  Ct  local Fctorms  Pakistan  clinol  A  0.6  00r  faren  eweeo
1992  Nakoel Fiker  Pakit,  cbehbncals  NIA  12.2  0 0  ;,3c  t  a_e 1992  Sind  Alai  Lid  Pakian  chwnrab  N/A  31  0.0  tocal  ernar 1902  Pak.'4rCt  Lid  Pakitan  chancab  NVA  1.0  0.0  bogl
1992  Pak  Clum Fslo  rs  Lid  Pakitn  chaicalo  NWA  7.3  0.0  bcal iawel 1992  Aseocie d Industio.  Nowthwra  Pak_ata  manucrming  N/A  2.5  2.5  foreign  isweor 1992  8w.  Vagelata Ghoo  Mitb. Awe  Pakuan  food  procer_n  N/A  05  0.0  bcal  _N 1992  Chian  Ghoa  MOe  QueeC  Pakistn  food  processing  N/A  0.7  00  bcal  e 1992  Hwr  Vegetable  0t  Procamg  Irnusaine  Paki_An  food  procernmg  N/A  0.5  0.0  blo  l  _  Sw
1992  B  wlew.  Rot.  Plant  Pakitn  food  processing  N/A  0.1  00  tlocal_e 1992  Faillbed  1.  Rob  Plant  Pakisn  food  processing  NrA  0.5  0.0  lc  t_"
1992  Gubrg  Rotb  Pb,tahbor.  Pakistan  food  procing  NA  A  0.0  loaw  r 1092  Heed  Office,  Roli P1nl, Labors  Pakisan  food  processing  N/A  CA4  0.0  ocal  e  r
1992  H 1 rdearbhd.  RotbPlant  Paiktan  food  processing  NWA  0.1  0.0  lcal_seeoc 1992  b'  bnd.  RodPlont  Pakan  fod  procing  N/A  02  00  loli  Weatrr 1992  Muttn. Rot Pbnt  Paktbn  food  procesing  N/A  01  00  loCal  Aester 1992  Uuftn  Road  Rota  Plnt.  Lahor.  Pakstn  food  procesing  NrA  04  0.0  locl  sweNer 1992  Psfwww.  Roti  Plant  Pakitan  food  processing  N/A  01  00  local 1992  OteSt.  Rota  Pat  Pkistn  food  prosg  NA  0.2  0.0  bcal  nweeo 1992  S1E Rob  Plknt.  Kerahc  Pakistan  food  rocsing  N1A  0 1  0.0  oca  a
1992  Tarn  i  Ri.  Plant.  Karachi  Pkbtan  food  processing  N/A  04  0.0  local  lar 1992  EninabedN -MiS  Pakistn  food  processing  N/A  04  00  bloalresr
1992  Fabod  Rice  i  PMaktbn  food  processing  N/A  03  00  blcal
1992  HaAbed  RiU  Mil  Pakhtan  food  procsing  N/A  0.8  0.0  ooa  n
1992  S  1_upa Rire Mi  Pakisbn  food  procms9g  NtA  04  0.0  bcalinvetr 1992  Sfranwal RieasM  Pakistn  food procrnag  N/A  02  00  blcal  weter 1992  NIllo  Port  Trust  Buidmp  Pakistan  pO"  NA  7.4  0.0  toca  lieser 1992  Hyrderw  Wdualies. tlydwrabld  Pakstan  manuofcturmg  N/A  0.3  00  local  r
1992  KekshklIndustrhne.  Faialabad  Pjakbtn  meoacturing  NWA  12  1.2  fortgn  isae0ar 1992  Sh Fa  trR  hnen&Sonm,ldMbn  Pakistan  naoufacturing  N/A  1.0  00  blcal  _ese 1992  Uaibd Induelirs Lrnt Faslabad  Pakbtan  ranuafactwing  N/A  08  0.0  local  _wea 1992  Wezr AUi  lodlue,.  Hydarabed  Pakutn  manufaitnlg  NtA  09  00  local  _mvad
1992  Kwch,  Pip.  Lid  Pakisbtn  en0inarnq  N/A  06  00  local  swear 1902  slropolen SOWl  Li  Paksbn  aing  ring  N/A  1.2  00  fcal  av 1992  Pak Sw-tipser  Litd  Pakitan  nginering  NA  0.4  00  loca  _
1992  Pior  Sal  Uia Litd  Pakistn  ginerqing  NWA  0.2  0.0  loal  swaod 1992  ViandolCanlCo  Ltd  Pakbtan  ceant  N/A  10.1  00  lkvlr
1992  DG. Khan Cement  Pakratn  cemenl  N/A  44.2  0.0  local  _ser 1992  GritawalC_aant  Lltd  Pakistn  coneant  N/A  134  00  local mva 1092  KohtatCiwrentCoLtd  Pakinbn  cement  N/A  84  00  locl  _waaer 1992  UMapl  Lea Ceant  Pakaon  ceannl  N/A  4.7  00  oc  nor
1992  Pak  Ceent  Lad  Pakstan  cement  NWA  3.1  0.0  tocalve_o 1992  WhEe  Cemnt Lid  Pakidan  cenant  N/A  2.2  0 0  klal  sN  (54) 1992  Zoo Pak  Canan  Lid  Pkikan  cner'  NWA  3.8  0.0  boal  envso  229.8  15.3 1990  HoteTabogs  Panama  howt  100.0  567.0  00  loom  linvter 1991  Hotel  Was  tn  Panama  hotl  100.0  20  0.0  blcaI  myv 1v91  Ar Pnam  Panama  Akiro  1000  230  II 7  As  P  bana  In
1992  Banero  del  Ajantica (Cobane)  Panama  banansa  1000  88  0.0  Orpoyeo  (3) 1992  Air Pma  nlan  rnaennl  Panama  Airkn  1000  N/A  N/A  pit 51%1  49%  dom  _e igni  r-op  59e6  270 t991  Comrparis  de  Mines Bueanentura  Pru  Mining  90  1.5  0.0  pubtc  ottr  proria sweats 1991  SotG_a  L  _eavin  Peru  Finance  Conanisa  N/A  I  I  0.0  pubic aft  prinvtasabrIi~~~~~~~~~~~~ii
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Privatzalon  Transactions  In Developing CountHes- 1968-1992
(Oollr  Amount n Mldions)
Fri 
Fa Yew  cm"  County  8  ior  Equl  Shwo  Amnot  Exom_  Flima  Nll_  P1er_u)  PROCE  Ezebase (m %)
lo1t  PrIn.  Poland  Dobrgent  100 0  20 0  20.0  Unlvr 191  Ak.  Potnd  Foodalils  60.0  112  11.2  $16 Mn fiturer  ivemanb  racoebd  Gerbw  Produab 9111  Prochnik  Pobnd  Tanfilss  e00  83  0.3  4.4% forign  invatra  pr"isa  uw 1S92  Ebarirn  Poland  Power Utlity  590  100  1.7  10%  ABB  Ae  Brown Bovari 1902  Tll  Poland  EloctricaelElactonics  S00  280  280  $45 Mn  tuto  rinv_eonw  AT&T 1992  M11- Pae  nA  Poland  Pulp & Paper Products  S00  00  00  $1.2 Mn future inv_esnnt  over 4-5 yo  conmitted  Kronon  GmWbH  (GeanyW) 1902  Expol Development Sank  Poland  Bankbg  475  119  11.9  prvast  nv_re 1W2  Falayka Somschdow  Makdi8razowych  Poland  Aubbrots  9000  00  0.0  joib  anUa,. $160 Mn  coronmitd. $830)n  o,er 5 yer  Fiat 1992  Eb  Poland  ElecricaliElacironics  510  104  104  Am  Brown  Slower  (51%) 1992  Kwizn  Putp  andP  per Compay  Poland  Pulp&Paw  Products  800  1200  120.0  S175Mn over5yoersconwed  lntsrnaliolPOr(US) 1992  Porolna  Walbrzych  Potand  prorcanm  700  31  31  prooaads osalnld  S*nd K NbI  ILdt 1992  Piwo tlatyn  Poland  brwery  53 0  7 3  7 3  procaeds  _abfr.td  JozfAdeban 1992  RO111  Poland  glow  S  0 0  0 1  0 0  pi  oced  aetirnamad  Min" (pob.d) 1962  Romeo  Poland  ttile  80.0  35  35  proc"edsonatb  d  AdodAider 1992  Proamnd  Poland  NtA  80 0  114  0 0  proceds  oerfnad  BHee  (Poan 1992  Cha  Poland  surglgalnsturnnts  S00  2.8  28  proceeds aeanaled  Aeaulp AG 1992  M.ao  Opoa  Poland  n.t  procass,ng  S5.0  3 5  3 5  proceeds  estinted  P  _Wb  CGrbH 1992  Re_zowka  Zakl  Warzyw Nbczoowoowe  Poland  consunm  goods  800  11.3  113  Gerbr 1992  Zaltlady Przmyrnok,  Zn,acrn  Ego Gbwno  Poland  potato promg  S0.0  NtA  MA  Basic Anric  Food 1092  Wicnu  Poland  menufacturmg  800  NIA  N/A  Glsda  (US) 1992  Hub SzkIa Okonnago  Sandoerl rz  Polnd  g9a  70 0  0 0  00  jot  venture. $100 Mn  futue oreabnennt by IFC and EBRD Pibin  (UIQ (40%). IFC.  EBRD (15%  each) 19C2  PWN  Poland  Printg  & Packaging  50 0  10  10  Luxeourg  Cambridg  Group 02  CowynsSui  ZeiadV KerSonerarke  Poland  Pulp a  Paper Products  800  0 S  00  Syeze 1902  Pod Ortem  Poland  HtolAb  1000  14  00  Purae  (67) 1992  Atno  Poeand  FoodshuJt  800  88  88  CPC InWntonat  (US)(80%)  7135  490.5 1969  Abance Segurdor  SA  Portugal  Insurance  49 0  44 0  29 0  split 18 3%1  18 3%1  18 3%  Union  dee AssurmoelMaguisfnv..tment  Fund 196  Conpas  do Seguros  rancuubdada  Porbual  Insur  490  1720  WA  NWA 1960  Benco  Tao  & Acores  Portugal  BSnking  490  2130  N/A  NIA 1980  Uncer  Portugal  Brewey  49 0  65  0  NtA  WA 1990  Conpanhia  de Seguro  Trnquldado  Portugal  Insurance  51 0  144 0  00  Eapo  Sento Group 1990  Tranisaler  Portugal  NMA  51.0  13  0  NIA  N/A 1960  Unwer  Portugal  Brewery  510  227 0  NA  WA 199O  Ianoo  Toga & Aeores  Portugal  Banking  310  157  0  MA  NWA 19C0  Hnc  Ponoe  do Atlantco  Portwgal  Banking  320  N/A  WA  NtA 1990  Ce  akce  Port  Brewey  1000  255.0  NWA  hA 1W61  conpenla  d  Saguros8Onanca  Portugal  insurance  80.0  128.0  WA  MA 1991  BHnco  Foonee e  Buroey  Portugal  Banking  800  2400  00  Banco Porguga,  da knat 1961  Alence Seuadora  SA  Portugal  Insurance  51 0  500  00  public oler  prkita  invear, 191  Dowrio  d  No  nme  Portugal  Nswpapora'Prt  Med  1000  580  NWA  prarab  nveeg 1991  enco ESPrjD  Santo * Comnercial  do Loibo  Portugal  Bankig  40 0  450 0  0 0  Eapinl  Seoa  Grouptpriwala  aveor 1991  Sociade  Fnanera  Portugusa  Portugal  Holdng Company  1000  1100  NWA  prrinbi ouveer 1961  8onenr  Portugal  Insurance  1000  1280  NtA  WA 1992  Banco Eairio  Sant  oConeral  do Lsboa  Portugal  Banking  800  s590  00  Eepr'd  Saoo  Group 1162  Palrlen  ds Porugal  Purtugal  PalrolunrPerochomanc  250  2290  229P0  TOTAL  Comorbmn  (20) 1992  manoo  Portuguao do Allenco  Portugal  Banking  200  377.0  NWA  pnvreu awlr  3.7190  25860 1992  IUr  Romeni  irwery  1000  MA  NWA  *ptil51%49%  domnaeorelpn  mov_m  (2) 1992  Vranco  Romano  ding  710  MA  NIA  Incorn  0.0  0.0 1161  C-n_ab  Rua  UMnulackoring  100 0  35 0  35 0  Hegemern 1191  Kwev  Aw*Tupllup  Dsgn  Ruoo  Airarat  WA  N/A  NtA  Heaym  , Flancaal 1961  Rzznoan  Ruma  ExportTrading  90.0  N/A  WA  coporas  av-eom 1161  Lanagrad Optical I  Machanical  Rus.  Opblcs  NA  N  N/A  NA  Blaryn  ich  Fbncml 1961  Soy-uznalapprt  Ruom  P*etounVPekochw  1000  NVA  NWA  manegenon  _eat-pty 1916  Leneuit  Rum  Manufactrinvg  A  N/A  NA  Ba6tymmrci Fbnc.l 1962  Ireiku Tobacco laciory  Rum  Tobacco  520  250  250  RJR Nablao  (6) 192  Pr_oageCrue  Rum_  Ship Buding  NWA  128  12.8  Coam Croeia  72.8  7.n 11911l1cor  South Airce  NWA  100.0  1.300 0  NtA  NA  (2) 1e9l  Aiof  SoutlhtAkwa  N/A  307  1000  NWA  Genor  (fe  20% to elyaea)  1400.0  00 1I60  Ke  Eleic  Power  Corp  South Kora  PowrU  Ull  210  2.1000  N/A  WA  2.1000  0.0 1996  Unitd  Moeor  Sri Lanka  AuturOb_to  1000  26  01  Jopn_e  inv_ors 1990  Dankokue  Porcelain  Sr Lanka  Porcelain  500  26  28  Japanasa  wMod 19o  ThuTiha  Tatia  Mkb  Sn  Lanka  Toxtilee  1000  50  50  Kabool  SplanirwotrenainvoolO 1990  Pugoda  Tmgl  Lod  Sri Lanka  Tesxle  100.0  2 3  1 5  pt  60%t 30%  L  _akab  Ltd  (Indla)icetl  itvos 1690  Lanka Onygeetd  Sri Lanka  tradwgogos  100.0  22  1.5  Noweanvdo 1990  HotSuheriLid  SriLanka  holol  1000  83  00  tuc11  ktvON 1991  Ceylon LeeProducts  Corporation  Sr. Lanka  LaetherLalher  Prodw  1000  1.0  00  bcel inv_laors~~~~~0  10  OV9:40t  *
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1916  Esdomw auhfflyo.  . SybdwpCa*e  AmWAu  red  100.0  1.4500  WA 19SIO  Au.  bhdh.  D.vpnunI  Crp.  Aud  _in,o.  10o00  3s.0  W
13  NWsomawain  W  _  M.11mui  Corp  Au  _IWO  100.  48.0  480  ___  _WBkdtN_Z  _di I191  S  _lto*dVk  B  nadm  S  g  100O0  1216.0C  _ 101  AUSSAI  Aue  T.hcmcns  100.0  Vlm.9  -_ l191  C  _uo  _mi,  blk  doAusbub  Padm  b"g  30.0  S  .O  1,0184
1191  A  __  Aaee  S  s  Amb_d.  AkdSve_  29.1  1  H1"KanoAf  Emm 131  S.f_o  Au_ak  P  _wdm.,e5uwn  19.0  73.1
1112  P_ar  _-d  Alw-mn  Suesb  Aus-Vb  Ud  10.0  127.6
191  Ausb.-  SabMa Corp  AUlluh  T_mkmm  100.0  1A  oea  b-m 1112  F.U  SoCmu.b  Aullak  .wD.  1000  608  F5c  ww 1112  Au.f_b  Ab..  A_uh  AMba  100.0  2S0.0  O  _ 1192  9  _h  ()f  Aw_uh  k=MNNM  1000  225.0  GD  (IV 12  Goa"woul  hiam  o  AusO  hu  bmwme.  100.0  9250  _  _AW  3  OR~
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1991  Culuc  Cmi.  WA  100.0  660  NW low  w.u  Energy  C  _im  G  57.0  205.6  prhumuh 1192  MwAlCeu.,ualwas  is.  c4ig  Ct  EBedaNFoamu  100.0  41S  Mad,.  _  T* lo2  T.6..Cm,Uh  C  _i.  T  __ae....w.s  53.0  1302  A_dC_m  w 1912  Po  Corp e  SSma  Cmi.e  CZc  27.0  WA  P{6.m  (24) I1O  Man  Aft  Co_mu  ms  _webiw,  W_  Ca._  uEdEbw*nmm  100.0  241  Tei.TnRkWAidaMd  5866 1930  N_mn LI.  _me  Co  D  _us  _a1000  7C000  W  700.0 low  Vmh  (_(mPW.ukuM  ng  m.dww  Fl_o.  u  20.0  187.0  WA 166  O0AIhnE  FIdM  20.0  116.0  WA
191  Aubanish  FwAwi  WA  1Z1  10.70  WA 1191  Oco  Fmhnd  (  __P.imudPalcdmm  WA  100.0  "S51U35S  N.  bai  (5) 1612  NMul.y - n.  Faid  p4kokwnV.6,niaw*  50.0  WA  SED  rl_  Tr  510.0 166  bmw (.msp  Fe.  _D-  100  360.0  WA
101  Tr_mpart Ar.  Tr__wepona  Frum  Ak*ws  36.0  A  NlA
1101  GQqo  ub5  Fam  C  _  4.7  WA  IMC "1R1  So.U  Ibto.mb  ElSA_N_E  J  _  FRome  Psuhsoodu.nK  WA  480.7  W 101  Cro  Lal  de F --  Fm.  A 119  25.0  376.0  WA low  Traw  Frane.  P  1ROIsEWPe6odwraw  1Z4  1.000 
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Privatlzaton  Transactions  In Industrfalked Coontries- 1988-1992
(Dola Amounb in  MliAon)
Foreign
Yw  Cm  _urv  CeOay  Sear  Equity  Shew  Anon  Exo  e  Fel  Noe  P  mu  PROCS
(n X)
t9e8  Voselgn  Gernany  msnufectsng  180  8150  NWA
10s"  DeusdhaVekehres Credibenk  Gernany  banking  249  280  WA
1io  Detach.  Swidlungs-und  Landerensnbonk  Germany  bankog  100.0  2370  N/A
1991  Jennphrm  Gerrmny  Phernuceubcals  1000  94.6  incldes debt  assumed  Gate 1jU1  We  _enser  Becteeren  Germany  Foodatutl  10.  250  Borden
1W1  Lo-omofatau-EsWotchnechen Werke  Germany  Manufacturr  1000  1770  AEG
1091  acatdn  Vwrserung  (Deutsche  VYochtrung)  Gernmny  Insurance  51.0  1512  A*enz AG
1081  Detcbo  Interhotl  Gemany  Hotesb  H/A  1,380O  Groenke  und Gulbnn 1991  Donot  Germany  HOsr  100.0  215t3  215.0  Hiriternetnal
1991  Deutsh  Veicherungs  Germany  Insurance  49.0  2784  Al/n  AG
1091  DaM  Beak  Germany  baning  465  245.0  (addtonal  to  5,200  Treuhend  deal)  NhA
1091  Henngador  Stahl  Germny  Stel  1000  640  Wri Group 9991  Verbuidnt  Gas  Grmnny  Gas  50  294  294  so"
1001  sotdreinkbolAltgadrtibubnn  plans  Germany  Beverage  Producer/So  1000  4500  450.0  Coca  Col t102  Wark  fur Frnsehlkbtronik  Genny  Elacur"IfElbcroncs  1000  19.8  198  Saian
1902  Spezlablu  Germany  Conttuction  1000  430  43.0  Mculan Hlg
1992  Bau-Tac  Gernmny  Consuction  1000  9.0  90  Jelhn11  Mow
1992  Nae  Bawre Gluhlerpenwerk  Germany  ElbaccaVElkcncs  1000  174.0  Ert_d Hot Verw_up
1992  pAdhko  lduxnesn  A UG.  Germany  Chonucale  1000  12.3  12.3  Carbon  ink 1992  Ralienower Opftcl Work  Grmny  Optics  100.0  170  amount  inchdas fut  conmbtent  OptF) 192  Hanniadnt & Brandenburg  St5_tworks  Germany  Stee  WA  62 1  621  Rite
1992  KOS  Germany  Engareeag  1000  131  13.1  rmount  =h  ftur  con_Malint  KabSehce
1992  inot  M ertndel  Grmany  Petoleun/Ptrochensc  1000  4.5000  2.2500  5050 spaitssumed  ENtAqultanH  lwyaen  lidalruon  (25) 1992  Mflalatache  Wasr-und  Unsvaebchnik  Germany  Wate UtNity  100.0  612  612  ThemesWan  8t398 19Ow  O1mip/c  Cawig  Grece  service  660  420  420  Souwrn Pe  Hotl  Corp (NZ) 1900  VaSe  Grace  Tenes  NWA  WA  N/A
10O0  Keafe  Groec  Saney  Equipment  NWA  N/A  WA 1090  Arioen  Greece  rTetie  WA  WA  Rank  Grou,p 10D0  A  Ien  Pae  MRs  Greece  Pu1lp  & Pape Producb  H/A  NIA  Capi  Mtae
1091  Benk  of Piraeu  Grece  banking  1000  170  Id/otd Trapeze 1991  Canbi  Greece  WA  1000  350  350  J. Bouln
1991  Elvs  Craec  N/A  1000  10.0  100  MibGei 1901  ti  Greece  NtA  100.0  170.0  170  0  Calo  u
1902  Hecls  Genral  Cant  Greoc  Cant  6908  8471  Cate
1902  Ebde  Groeom  ElactricalfElctnron  100.0  N/A  E-o  p
192  Eltven ehtwrds  Greece  Ship  Budding  1000  60.0  $12Mtn  cash.  $48Mn  _sumed  debt  Pdeacoreortium  013) 1002  P*ail-Palei  Tan GWibH  Greece  Texies  100.0  N/A  Nowe  iaunwolSpur  S81  1 1902  Sh.ngheionflnr  port  Hong  Kong  Ports/Docks  500  1811  00  Huiiot  oWh  bo  (2) 1002  Hog  Kong  A  Cargo  Termnnaa  Ltd  Hong Kong  Arport Service  100  137  137  Che  4NatAvionCorp  1948 1991  Gr  _ore  Irabnd  Sugar  42.0  142.0  NWA
1991  ti/h  Lie  raland  tnsuranca  5630  347.0  WA  (3) 1082  Greancor  kralnd  Sugar  14.9  N/A  ktimet  Bent  kI  Oflreland  489.0 108  Paz  Pdrolkumo  terl  energy  74  0  9530  950  Autin  Inveaims 19e80  Jalemn  Economic  Corp  eral  tinance  82  0  5330  NtA
1900  Berek  lerl  N/A  60  74.0  US  ADR  ious  WA
1991  Berazq rea  Tecnconnnuncabon  Corportion  nsral  Telacommunications  180  NA  WA
1002  LUied Mtuah  Bank  eraet  Banking  28.0  10O.0  Gad  dZerv 1902  ID  Holding  tera  Holding  Conmany  42.5  357.0  privatine  swere/Recanti Fmn*  (7) 1082  lareatChem/cl  ftr"  Cherrcals  20.0  235.0  prmfl  veetrs  914.0 1ION  tMadobance  Ittly  banking  31.9  8400  coneortium  of  Itnanoteitbbne IOU  VMUMolon  Ihaly  manufactring  100.0  510  NtA 1OU  Eaimont  hbN  WA  20 0  938 0  WA
1991  Banondi Rom  Iholy  Banking  1000  N/A  Cas  di Reiprmnio
1991  BanoodiNapot  Ibty  Banking  20.0  81.9  /A
1901  EammdiS ntnoSpianl  sy  Banking  1000  NWA  Ca  dRi  perrnod 1991  STET  Italy  Tr scomnuncicto  NWA  2750  Savmge shares  WA
1902  Si  wr  hluty  Shivpping  49 0  N/A  WA 19e2  Ceenters  del Tureno  Rbly  Cement  51.8  388f0  Caltgirone
102  STET  "luy  Tokecomrnuncations  16.0  592 1  NtA 1992  Ebag Beiky  holy  Engineering  71  NA  Irntlction  on  Milan  Exchange  Credit  Lyonnai Group 1902  Seao  Italy  EbctricrqEkectonics  N/A  N/A  Sotin
1902  Psi  lr4ty  Foodotut  100,0  216  Unichips
t102  Coneorzmo  do Credao  pr  la Opera  Pubbhteh  Italy  Banking  50  0  1.842  0  ntnitou  Son  Paolo  Toruin 1902  Sociakanhtn  pe  rE  earcirm  dale Tabcomunicazioni  luty  lacommonicetinn  20.5  340.7  N/A58
Prlvalzatlon  Transactons In IndusbDailzed  Countrls-  1988-1992
(0o0w Anbunt  in  MUons)
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Yw  Cenpen  CO_OY  Sad  Eyily  Shime  hAmose Ex  _h  FnlNoe  Pdmu  PRC
(m%)
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(in  US$ Million)
1998  1989  1990  1991  1992  TOTAL
Argentina  0  0  1101.9  853  2067.2  4,022.1
Bolivia  0  0  0  0  0  0.0
Brazil  0  0  0  54.1  0  54.1
Chile  139  115  0  0  0  254.0
China  0  0  0  0  0  0.0
Colombia  0  0  0  52  0  52.0
Czechoslovakia  0  0  22  527  1333.3  1,882.3
Honduras  12.4  0.3  0  0.5  0.1  13.3
Hungary  0  421.6  451.2  733.4  689.5  2,295.7
Jamaica  0  42  42  42  0  126.0
Malaysia  0  0  0  0  89.3  89.3
Mexico  55  0  115  787.3  91.2  1,048.5
Nigeria  0  0  0  0  0  0.0
Pakistan  0  0  0  4.2  11.2  15.4
Peru  0  0  0  0  139.8  139.8
Philippines  0  0  0  75  212.4  287.4
Poland  0  0  15.4  261.5  213.3  490.2
Portugal  0  29  0  229  0  258.0
Sri Lanka  0  0.1  10.6  0  26  36.7
Turkey  33.2  165  97  13.1  65  373.3
Venezuela  0  0  0  1499.3  13.5  1,512.8
TOTAL  239.6  773  1855.1  5131.4  4951.8  12,950.9
Table  A-4
rVAwAEoArTAtM  fA.  M  wNIltN  rCTAWI*rMiI  t19
(in  percent)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  TOTAL
Argentina  0.00  0.00  54.88  34.97  44.05  35.55
Bolivia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Brazil  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.38  0.00  0.62
Chile  98.58  62.50  0.0c  0.00  0.00  14.19
China  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00
Colombia  0.00  0.00  0.f,0  12.38  0.00  2.36
Czechoslovakia  0.00  0.00  10.63  87.83  88.89  73.41
Honduras  25.83  0.59  0.00  1.11  0.24  5.78
Hungary  0.00  0.00  0.00  50.16  57.46  86.24
Jamaica  0.00  73.68  30.43  33.07  0.00  33.60
Malaysia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.48  0.75
Mexico  2.12  0.00  4.37  16.53  1.47  5.45
Nigeria  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Pakistan  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.63  4.07  1.31
Peru  0.00  0,00  0.00  0.00  65.02  41.86
Philippines  0.00  0.00  0.00  13.79  31.47  8.85
Poland  0.00  0.00  17.30  89.86  60.94  64.84
Portugal  0.00  1.67  0.00  11.33  0.00  3.00
Sri Lanka  0.00  0.50  24.65  0.00  34.67  13.01
Turkey  9.38  24.89  14.18  1.62  5.91  10.34
Venezuela  0.00  0.00  0.00  78.33  1.35  41.25
TOTAL  1.71  4.59  10.60  19.33  15.65  12.16
Note: FDI  data for 1992  are  World  Bank  and IMF  staff estimates.BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barnes,  Guillerno, Lessons  From Bank  Privatization  in Mexico,  Working  Paper 1027,
Country  Economics  Department,  World  Bank, November  1992.
Berg,  Elliot and Mary M. Shirley,  Divestiture  in Developing  Countries,  World Bank
Discussion  Papers 11, World  Bank, Washington,  D.C., 1987.
Bogetic,  Zeljko and  Michael  Conte, Privatizing  Eastern European  Economies:  A Critical
Rew  and Proposal,  International  Discussion  Paper, Europe and Central  Asia
Region,  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C., December  1992.
Candoy-Sekse,  Rebecca,  Techniques  of Privatization  of State-Owned  Enterprises,  Vo.III
Inventory  of Country  Experience  and Reference  Materials,  World Bank  Technical
Paper 90, World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C., 1988.
Clutterbuck,  David, Going  Private:  Privatizations  Around  the World,  Mercury  Books,
London 1991.
Edwards,  Sebastian,  "Capital  Flows,  Foreign  Direct  Investment,  and  Debt-Equity  Swaps
in Developing  Countries",  NBER  Working  Paper No. 3497, Cambridge,  October
1990.
Forbes, John, "Privatization  in the Philippines:  Progress  and Prospects",  mimeo,  Society
for International  Development,  Washington,  D.C., 2/8/1993.
Gayle,  Dennis  J. and Jonathan  N. Goodrich,  Privatization  and Deregulation  in Global
Perspective,  Quorum  Books,  New York, 1990.
Gooptu, Sudarshan,  Portfolio  Investment  Flows  to Emerging  Markets, Working  Paper
1117,  International  Economics  Department,  World Bank,  Washington,  D.C., 1993.
Im, Soo J., Robert Jalali  and Jamal Saghir,  Privatization  in the Republics  of the Former
Soviet Union:  Framework  and Initial  Results,  PSD Group,  Legal  Department  PSD
and Privatization  Group,  CFS,  Joint Staff Discussion  Paper, World Bank,
Washington,  D.C. June 1993.
International  Financial  Law Review,  Special  Supplement  Sptember  1992
International  Monetary  Fund,  International  Financial  Statistics,  various issues,
Washington,  D.C.
--Fund Supported  Programs.  Fiscal  Policy  and Income  Distribution,  Occasional
Paper 46, Washington,  D.C., 1985.Kikeri,  Sunita,  John Nellis  and Mary Shirley,  Privatization:  The Lessons of Experiene,
World Bank,  Washington,  D.C., 1992.
LatninFinance  various issues,  Miami.
--"Privatizations  In Latin  America  1993",  Supplement,  Miami,  March 1993.
Minovi,  Maziar,  A Comparison  of the National  Privatization  Strategies  of Medium-to-
Large Industrial  Enterprises  in Hungary  and Poland: 1989-1992,  dissertation
(forthcoming),  George Washington  University,  Washington,  D.C.
Mosley,  Paul, "Privatization,  Policy-Based  Lending  and WorldBank  Behaviour",  in Paul
Cook and Colin  Kirkpatrick  (eds.),  Privatization  in Less Developed  Countries,
New York 1988.
Nankani,  Helen,  Techniques  of Privatization  of State-Owned  Enterprises Vo.II Selected
Country  Case Studies,  World  Bank Technical  Discussion  Paper 90, World Bank,
Washington,  D.C., 1988.
Pfeffermann,  Guy  P. and Andrea  Madarassy,  Trends in Private  Investment  in Developing
Countries  1993,  Discussion  Paper 16, International  Finance  Corporation,
Washington,  D.C., 1992.
Privatisation  International,  Yearbook,  various  issues,  London.
Vuylsteke,  Charles,  Techniques  of Privatization  of State-Owned  Enterprises,  Vo.I
Methods  and Implementation,  World Bank  Technical  Paper 88, World Bank,
Washington  D.C., 1988.
World  Bank, World  Debt Tables 1992-93,  Washington  D.C., 1992.
--"The  Evolution,  Situation,  and Prospects  of the Electric  Power Sector in the
Latin American  and Caribbean  Countries",  Report 7, Latin  America  and the
Caribbean  Regional  Office,  Infrastructure  and Energy  Division,  Washington,
D.C., 1991.Polloy  Research  Working Paper Bettle
Contaot
Tit  Author  Dots  for paper
WPSI  178  Productivity  of Public  Spending,  John  BSaes  Soptember  193  C. Jones
Se¢toral  Alloation  Choices,  and  Anwar  Shah  37699
Economic  Growth
WPS1  179  How  the  Market  Transiton  Affeted  BartlomlJ  Kailnski  September  1993  P. Kokila
Export  Perforrnue in  the  Central  33716
European  Economies
WP81180  The  Financing  an Taxdion  of U.S.  Harry  Hulzinga  September  1993  R. Vo
Direct  Investment  Abroad  31047
WPSI181  Reforming  Healh Cae:  A Case  for  Zeliko  Bogetic  September  1993  F.  Smith
Stay-Well  Heaith  Insurance  Dennis  Hetley  36072
WPS1  182 Corporate  Governance  in  Contral  Cheryl  W.  Gray  Soptember  1993  M.  Berg
and  Eastern  Europe:  Lessons  from  Rebecca  J. Hanson  31450
Advanced  Market  Economies
WPS1  183  Who  Would  Vote  for Inflation  in  Cheikh  Kane  September  1993  T. Hollestelle
Brazil?  An  Integrated  Framework  Jacques  Morisett  30968
Approach  to Inflation  and  Income
Distribution
WPS1  184  Providing  Social  Benefits  in  Russia:  Simon  Commander  September  1993  0. del  Cid
Redefining  the  Roles  of  Firms  and  Richard  Jackman  35195
and  Government
WPS1  185  Reforming  Hungarian  Agricultural  Morris  E.  Morkre  September  1993  N. Artis
Trade  Policy:  A Quantitative  David  G.  Tarr  38004
Evaluation
WPS1  186 Recent  Estimates  of Capital  Flight  Stijn  Claessens  September  1993  R.  Vo
David  Naud6  31047
WPS1  187 How  Should  Sovereign  Debtors  Andrew  Warner  September  1993  J. Queen
Restructure  Their  Debts?  Fixed  33740
Interest  Rates,  Flexible  Interest
Rates,  or Inflation-indexed
WPS1  188  Developmentalism,  Socialism,  and  Mario  Marcel  September  1993  S.  Florez
Free  Market  Reform:  Three  Decades Andr6s  Solimano  39075
of  Income  Distribution  in  Chile
WPS1  189 Can  Communist  Economies  Alan  Geb  September  1993  PRDTM
Transform  Incrementally?  China's  Gary  Jefferson  37471
Experience  Inderjit  Singh
WPS1190  The  Govemment's  Role  in  Japanese Yoon  Je  Cho  September  1993  T. Ishibe
and  Korean  Credit  Markets:  A New  Thomas  Helimann  37665
Institutional  Economics  PerspectivePolicy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1191  Rent-Shaing  in the  Multi-Fibre  Geoffrey  J. Bannister  September  1993  A.  Daruwala
Arrangement:  Th. Case  of  Mexioo  33713
WPSI  192 Effects  of  Tax  Reform  on  Argentina's  Jacques  Morisset  September  1993  G.  Carter
Revenues  Alejandro  kzquberdo  30603
WPS1  193  The  Armenian  Labor  Market  in  Milan  Vodoplvec  Seotember  1993  S. Florez
Transiion:  I"ues  and  Options  Wayne  Vroman  39075
WPSI  194  How  Fas Has  Chinese  Industry  ToM  raniw  September  1993  E.  Khine
Grown?  37471
WPS1  195  The  Enterprise  Sector  and  Mark  Schaffer  September  1993  E.  Khine
Emergence  of  the  Polish  Fiscal  37471
Crisis,  1990-91
WPS1  196  Corporate  Tax  Structure  and  Jeffrey  Bernstein  September  1993  C. Jones
Production  Anwar  Shah  37699
WPSI  197  Determinants  of Inflation  among  Bnino  Boccara  September  1993  C. Jones
Franc  Zone  Countries  in  Africa  Shantayanan  Devarajan  37699
WPSI  198  Enterprise  FRaform  In  China:  The  Natalie  Lichtenstein  September  1993  M.  Rangarajan
Evolving  Legal  Framework  81710
WPS1  199  Public  Pension  Govemance  and  Olivia  Mitchell  October  1993  D. Evans
Performance:  Lessons  for Developing  37496
Countries
WPS1200  The  Lfe-Cycle  Distributional  Jane  Falkingham  October  1993  D. Evans
Consequences of Pay-As-You-Go  Paul  Johnson  37496
and  Funded  Pension  Systems
WPS1  201 Five  Criteria  for Choosing  among  Margaret  E.  Grosh  October  1993  M.  Quintero
Poverty  Programs  37792
WPS1202  Privatization  and  Foreign  Investment  Frank  Sader  October  1993  Rose  Vo
in  the  Developing  World,  1988-92  31047
WPS1  203 Determinants  of  Value-Added  Tax  Zelijko  Bogetic  October  1993  F.  Smith
Revenue:  A Cross-Section  Analysis Fareed  Hassan  36072
WPS1204  Structural  Adjustrrient,  Economic  Nisha  Agrawal  October  1993  K.  Rivera
Performance,  and  Aid  Dependency Zafar  Ahmed  34141
in  Tanzania  Michael  Mared
Roger  Nord